1		COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II
2		2023 MAR 24 PM 3: 51
3		STATE OF WASHINGTON
4	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPUTY	
5)	N. 56701 1 H
6	In re Pers. Restraint of)	No. 56791-1-II
7	DARYL ROGERS II	REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE
8	Petitioner.	
9)	
10	INTRO	DDUCTION
11	COMES NOW, Petitioner Daryl Roger	rs, acting pro se with a reply to Respondent State
12	of Washington's response, received February	28, 2023.
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14	F	ACTS
15	On March 12, 2022, Petitioner filed a l	Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to CrR
16	7.8. This was transferred to the Court as perso	nal restraint petition on March 18, 2022. On May
17	6, 2022, Petitioner moved to voluntarily withd	raw the personal restraint petition. On May 10,
18	2022, this Court denied the voluntarily withdra	aw of the personal restraint petition electing to put
19	the petition on stay until November 4, 2022. T	his was done to give the Petitioner an opportunity
20	to bring forth a supplemental petition that mee	ets the time bar and contains all relevant issues
21	(Exhibit A). On November 4, 2022, Petitioner	filed the current 7 issue supplemental petition in
22	this case. On December 5, 2022, this Court or	dered the Respondent State of Washington to
23	respond to the petition in accordance with RA	P 16.9 by February 3, 2023 (Exhibit B).

Respondent State of Washington failed to meet its February 3, 2023, deadline. On February 8, 2023, Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two clerk issued warning to Respondent State of Washington to respond by February 21, 2023, Respondent State of Washington filed its response on February 21, 2023, and Petitioner receives this response on February 28, 2023.

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ARGUMENT

1) State's Response

Respondent State of Washington has failed to actually respond to the issues presented in the supplemental petition. Petitioner filed a 7 issue supplemental personal restraint petition that included challenges of a) Offender Score under i. the washout provision; ii. the State's failure to prove criminal history; and iii. failure to conduct a proper same criminal conduct analysis, b) Brady Violation, c) Aggravating Factors i. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n) and ii. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g), and d) Due Process/Lack of Jurisdiction. The Respondent has only touched on the issue of same criminal conduct but has not addressed whether there was a failure to conduct a proper same criminal conduct analysis. Every other issue presented the Respondent has failed to respond to, even though this Court ordered the Respondent to either argue or concede to each issue under RAP 16.9 (Exhibit B). RAP 16.9, which governs responses to a personal restraint petition, states in relevant part "The response must answer the allegations in the petition.... Respondent should also identify in the response all material disputed questions of fact." RAP 16.9(a). The Washington State Supreme Court confirmed "The State's response must answer the allegations of the petition and identify all material disputed questions of fact. RAP 16.9. In order to define disputed questions of fact, the state must meet the petitioner's evidence with its own competent evidence." In re Pers. Restraint

1	of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 886, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992). The Washington State Court of
2	Appeals Division Two would echo this statement in In re Pers. Restraint of Gasteazoro-
3	Paniagua, stating "If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of prejudicial error, we then
4	examine the State's response, which must 'answer the allegations of the petition and identify
5	all material disputed questions of fact.' To identify disputed questions of fact, the State must
6	meet the petitioner's evidence with its own competent evidence." In re Pers. Restraint of
7	Gasteazoro-Paniagua, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 2773, 2016 WL 6756224 (Wash. Ct. App.
8	November 15, 2016) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 160 Wn. App. 479, 489,
9	251 P.3d 884 (2010)). The Respondent had the opportunity and was actually required by
10	RAP 16.9(a) and the Perfection Letter to controvert the claims in the petition or any part
11	thereof but chose not to. The Respondent's failure to address the issues presented should be
12	viewed by this Court as a concession on any issue not addressed. If any issue not addressed
13	is not viewed as a concession by this Court in light of RAP 16.9(a) and the Perfection Letter
14	at the very least the Respondent should be prevented from making any future arguments to
15	these issues as the Respondent has had ample time and opportunity to respond to these issue
16	and has chosen not to contest the issues or the facts presented. The Respondents failure to
17	address the issues presented should be viewed by this Court as a concession on any issue no
18	addressed.////And if it is not viewed as a concession on any issue not addressed at the very
19	least the Respondent should be prevented from making any future arguments to these issues
20	as the Respondent has had ample time and opportunity to respond to these issues and chose
21	not to.

2) Offender Score

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a. Washout Provision

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Petitioner still contends that his juvenile class c conviction for attempted residential burglary on May 23, 2007 washed out in accordance with RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c), which states in relevant part "class C prior felony convictions other than sex offenses shall not be included in the offender score if, since the last date of release from confinement (including full-time residential treatment) pursuant to a felony conviction, if any, or entry of judgment and sentence, the offender had spent five consecutive years in the community without committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction." RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). Petitioner's juvenile class c conviction for attempted residential burglary occurred on May 23, 2007 (Exhibit C). Petitioner's last date of release from confinement was June 22, 2007. Petitioner's current conviction occurred on November 2, 2018, more than 11 years after Petitioner's release from confinement for attempted residential burglary (Exhibit C). The Washington State Supreme Court stated "[T]he statute is split into two separate classes: a trigger clause, 'which identifies the beginning of the five-year [washout] period,' and a continuity/interruption clause, 'which sets forth the substantive requirements an offender must satisfy during the five-year period.' Accordingly, the plain language of RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c) provides that the washout period on certain prior convictions will trigger when five years have elapsed between the last date of release from confinement pursuant to a felony conviction and a subsequent conviction." State v. Schwartz, 194 Wn.2d 432, 450 P.3d 141 (2019) (quoting State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 821, 239 P.3d 354 (2010)). The washout trigger clause began for Petitioner's juvenile class c conviction for attempted residential burglary on June 22, 2007, Petitioner's last date of release from confinement. The Petitioner subsequently met the substantive requirements an offender must satisfy during the

five-year period contained within the washout continuity/interruption clause until November 2, 2018, more than double the five-year period requirement.

Because the Petitioner met the requirements necessary for his juvenile class c conviction for attempted residential burglary to washout, it cannot be used in Petitioner's offender score.

Therefore, Petitioner requests the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for correction of the Petitioner's offender score without the juvenile class c conviction for attempted residential burglary and resentencing.

b. Criminal History

Petitioner still contends the State did not meet its burden in proving the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) as part of Petitioner's criminal history (Exhibit C). It is the burden of the State to prove criminal history by more than a prosecutor's unsupported summary. And a defendant's failure to object to an incorrect calculation of an offender score is not sufficient. State v. Cate, 194 Wn.2d 909, 912-13, 453 P.3d 990 (2019) (citing State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 287 P.3d 584 (2012)). Additionally, defendants have no responsibility to present evidence of criminal history. State v. Lopez, 147 Wn.2d 515, 521, 55 P.3d 609 (2002).

In Hunley, the Washington State Supreme Court stated "'The best evidence of a prior conviction is a certified copy of the judgment." Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 910 (quoting State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 480, 973 P.2d 452 (1999)). In this particular case the State did present a certified copy of the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) judgment to the trial court during the testimony of the State's identification specialist Nancy Druckenmiller, of the Clark County Sheriff's Office (Exhibit M). The State presented Ms. Druckenmiller to match Petitioner's

fingerprints to the certified copy of the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) judgment and sentence. In a question and answer with the prosecuting attorney Ms. Druckenmiller testified to being unable to match the Petitioner to the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) judgment and sentence:

Q: (By Mr. Hayes) So as part of this case, did you compare those two sets of booking prints of Daryl Craig Rogers to two different judgment and sentences?

A: Yes.

Q: First one I'm going to hand up, pertains to case number 05800471-7, is this one of the judgments and sentences you reviewed?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: Would it be fair to say that, due to the poor quality of the prints, you were not able to make any comparison as to the prints on that judgment and sentence?

A: That is correct. 6 Verbatim Report Proceedings (VRP) at 795+ (Exhibit M)

The testimony of Ms. Druckenmiller, presented by the State, does not meet the burden of proving the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) judgment is a part of the Petitioner's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence. In actuality, based on the testimony of Ms. Druckenmiller the State is effectively unable to prove who the defendant of the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) judgment is. This is because a certified copy of the judgment is the best evidence of a prior conviction. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 910. Yet, the poor quality of the prints, makes it impossible to make any comparison to the prints on the judgment and sentence of the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) conviction. Any other evidence that would prove who the defendant of this 2005

burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) conviction is would not only be secondary to the "certified copy of the judgment," any other evidence could only be verified by the "certified copy of the judgment" of the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) conviction.

Since the State has failed to meet its burden of proving the 2005 burglary in the first degree (case no. 05800471-7) conviction is a part of the Petitioner's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner requests the sentence be vacated. The Washington State Supreme Court has "vacated sentences on multiple occasions where the state failed to provide sufficient evidence of prior convictions." Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 911(citing State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 918, 928-29, 205 P.3d 113 (2009)) See also Lopez, 147 Wn.2d 523 Ford, 137 Wn.2d 482.

c. Same Criminal Conduct Analysis

Petitioner still contends the trial court erred in not conducting a same criminal conduct analysis under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) as it pertains to Petitioner's 3 convictions for rape of a child in the first degree. The trial conducted a double jeopardy analysis (Exhibit D), but never did a same criminal conduct analysis. The two analyses, though similar, are distinctly separate. "A double jeopardy violation claim is distinct from a 'same criminal conduct' claim and requires a separate analysis. A double jeopardy violation focuses on the allowable unit of prosecution and involves the charging and trial stages. The 'same criminal conduct' claim involves the sentencing phase and focuses instead on the defendant's criminal intent, whether the crimes were committed at the same time and at the same place, and whether they involved the same victim." State v. French, 157 Wn.2d 593, 611-12,

141 P.3d 54 (2006) (citing State v. Tili, 139 Wn.2d 107, 119 n.5, 985 P.2d 365 (1999). "Even though they may be separate, albeit similar, analyses, a determination that a conviction does not violate double jeopardy does not automatically mean that it is not the same criminal conduct." State v. Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d 218, 222, 370 P.3d 6 (2016) (citing Tili, 139 Wn.2d at 124 (finding defendant's three first degree rape convictions did not violate double jeopardy but were part of the same criminal conduct, the court held that Tili's criminal intent to commit several rapes did not change from one act of penetration to the next)).

In the Petitioner's case the trial courts double jeopardy analysis identifies the 3 acts constituting the four convictions. This is the unit of prosecution portion of the double jeopardy analysis. On the other hand, the same criminal conduct analysis, which the trial court failed to conduct, asks 1. Whether the acts constituting the convictions have the same criminal intent or were in furtherance of the same objective criminal intent? 2. Whether the acts constituting the convictions happen at the same time and place? 3. Whether the acts constituting the convictions have the same victim? The double jeopardy analysis conducted by the trial court was not a determination of these questions and therefore cannot be considered a same criminal conduct analysis. Since the trial court failed to conduct a proper same criminal conduct analysis of Petitioner's convictions, Petitioner requests the case be remanded for a hearing to properly determine the issue of same criminal conduct.

- 3) Brady Violation
- a. Brady Standard/Requirements

Petitioner contends he does not have to show that the disclosure of the evidence at issue in this case would have resulted in an acquittal to show the exculpatory evidence was material,

since under Brady the standard is not about the sufficiency of the evidence. "One of the most important characteristics is that it is 'not a sufficiency of evidence test.' Id. Thus a 'showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the supposed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal.' Id. The question 'is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.' Id." In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson, 174 Wn.2d 474, 487, 276 P.3d 286 (2012) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1995) (relying on U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985))).

In Stenson, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that to prove materiality a petitioner must show that it's reasonably probable that if the evidence was disclosed it would have resulted in a different outcome. Stating "[w]hat then, must a petitioner show to prove materiality? He or she must show 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Stenson, 174 Wn.2d at 487 (alterations added) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) id at 685 (White, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment)). The Stenson court would further state "[A] 'reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' One does not show a Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but rather by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in a different light." Stenson, 174 Wn.2d at 487 (alterations added) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). Id.

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witnesses, and undermine the State's argument as to the Petitioner's opportunity to commit these crimes.

"Under 'reasonable probability,' a Brady violation does not require a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a changed outcome if the withheld evidence had been released Brady requires only a lack of confidence in that outcome." Mulamba, 199 Wn.2d at 498. The Stenson Court put it this way, "[t]he question here is not whether [Petitioner] has proved his innocence that is not his burden under Brady. As the United States Supreme Court said in Kyles, 'the question is not whether the State would have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that the jury's verdict would have been the same." Stenson, 174 Wn.2d at 493 (alterations added)(quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 453). Based on this ruling in Stenson, Brady and its progeny, requires this Court to consider whether one juror might have had reasonable doubt that the Petitioner was guilty if (1) the State had never introduced evidence that the complaining witness and her family lived in the home from either March 10, 2010 or April 10, 2010 until before Fall 2010 3 VRP at 333-34 (Exhibit J) (2) the defense team properly impeached the credibility of the complaining witness and Ms. Poindexter and showed the limited amount of time the complaining witness and her family lived in the home and (3) the defense team had the benefit of the undisclosed evidence to create a persuasive defense theory of the case. Additionally, disclosure would have raised opportunities for the defense to attack the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation. Because the differences in the timeframes put forth by the State and the defense and how these timeframes would be considered with all other evidence, there is reason to believe that at least one juror would have had reasonable doubt had this evidence been available to be considered. Since, "[c]onfidence is undermined if even 'one juror might have had reasonable doubt' as to the

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[Petitioner's] guilt if the jury had heard the undisclosed evidence." Mulamba, 199 Wn.2d at 504 (alterations added) (quoting Stenson, 174 Wn.2d at 493).

i. Aggravating Factor

Brady material applies to evidence affecting punishment as it does to evidence affecting guilt. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment" Kyles, 514 U.S. 419. (alterations added) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1965)). Since aggravating factors affects the punishment, a defendant is facing, Brady material applies to aggravating factors. In this case petitioner was found guilty of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) as an aggravating factor. This states that "The offense was part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim under the age of eighteen years manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time." RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g). The evidence at issue in this Brady violation has a bearing on the determination of Petitioner's guilt under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) as it significantly shortens the length of time these events were to have occurred and in doing so the number of incidents that were to have occurred.

The complaining witness states that the complaining witness and her family lived with the Petitioner for a long time. 3 VRP at 277-78, 288. And Ms. Poindexter states that the complaining witness and her family lived with the Petitioner for a few months, beginning March 10, 2010 or April 10, 2010 and leaving before fall 3 VRP at 333-34, after June 30, 2010. 2 VRP at 193 (Exhibit I). The documentation of the 2010 police incident that the prosecutor acknowledges was in the possession of Detective Hernandez while investigating these crimes in 2016, would have negated both of these statements and proven that the complaining witness the

complaining witness and her family lived with the Petitioner for a matter of weeks before the 2010 police incident occurred. And since this aggravating factor is in regards to the length of time and number of incidents that was to have occurred, the evidence at issue is material to determining this aggravating factor.

Evidence that would prove the exact date the complaining witness and her family left the home, is material. That evidence is material because it proves that "multiple incidents" did not occur "over a prolonged period of time." This is reason to believe that at least one juror would have had reasonable doubt as to the Petitioners guilt of committing these crimes as "part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim under the age of eighteen years manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time" under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) as an aggravating factor, had this evidence been available to be considered.

RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) weighs not only as an aggravating factor, but also on the determination of guilt of the principle crimes in this particular case. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) is uniquely linked to the principle crimes in this case because it requires the showing of "multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time." If there is a determination that "multiple incidents" did not occur "over a prolonged period of time," it brings into question whether or not the number of principle crimes alleged to have occurred actually happened, or if any of the principle crimes actually happened at all. By this RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) is intricately intertwined with the principle crimes in this particular case. And any Brady material as it relates to the determination of guilt under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) an aggravating factor affecting punishment, is also Brady material as it relates to the principle crimes in this particular case.

b. Prosecution Witness Testimony

The evidence at issue impeaches the testimony of the only two prosecution witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the time in question, the complaining witness and Ms. Poindexter.

i. Complaining Witness's Testimony

The complaining witness's testimony regarding the timeframe when she initially recalled it was that these events occurred for a year. 3 VRP at 277-78. THE COMPLAINING WITNESS further testified that although she is not sure of exactly how long these events occurred, that it was a long time. 3 VRP at 288. These statements even if not giving an exact timeframe would lead any reasonable person to believe these events occurred over an extended period of time. To further this idea the charging period in the Court's Instructions To The Jury for each of the convictions was "on or about or between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2010." (Exhibit E). As the Court's Instructions To The Jury must be considered during deliberations to reach a verdict (Exhibit E), the charging period in the Court's Instructions To The Jury would only lend itself to corroborating he complaining witness's testimony that the events occurred over a long time, even if not for an exact year, without documentation proving otherwise. Therefore, documentation of an event that would impeach the complaining witness's testimony and contradict these statements are both favorable to the Petitioner and material to this case.

ii. Poindexter's Testimony

Petitioner contends in his petition that the evidence at issue in this Brady violation would also impeach the testimony of prosecution witness Amanda Poindexter's timeframe of the events in question. Ms. Poindexter's timeframe was that her and her children, including the complaining witness, lived in the home for a "few months," arriving on March 10, 2010 or April 10, 2010 and leaving before fall, after the June birthday of the complaining witness 3 VRP at 333-34, which is

June 30 2 VRP at 193. This would mean Ms. Poindexter and her children left the home sometime in July or August of 2010.

Impeaching Brady information is not limited to applying to the complaining witness. Especially if, as the Ruling suggests, "The complaining witness offered no such timeline in her testimony." Based on all remaining testimony the only timeframe the prosecution put forth and relies on comes during the testimony of Ms. Poindexter, which is the only testimony that suggests the Petitioner had the opportunity to commit these crimes. This would then make evidence that would contradict Ms. Poindexter's timeframe material to the case. For example, in Benn the court ruled that information about a prosecution witness was deemed material when the witness's testimony was the source of most of the support for the defendant's motive. The evidence of the witness's history was considered material because of the witness's overwhelming importance to the prosecution's overall case. (Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the evidence at issue in this current Brady violation is impeaching because it contradicts the timeframe testimony of the only prosecuting witness that gave any testimony of a timeframe and this timeframe testimony given by the prosecuting witness is the only testimony giving the Petitioner the opportunity to commit these crimes. Making this witness's timeframe testimony critical to the prosecution's overall theory of the case and is not corroborated by any other witnesses or evidence.

Whether as Petitioner has stated, the complaining witness's testimony offers a time frame or the complaining witness did not offer a timeframe and the prosecution is relying solely on the timeframe put forth in Ms. Poindexter's testimony, the evidence at issue is favorable to the Petitioner, impeaches the State's witness, and is material to the case.

c. Defense Witness Testimony

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The testimony of all defense witnesses were the testimony of individuals with firsthand knowledge of the time in question. Each of which stated the complaining witness and her family lives with the Petitioner and his family for one and half to two months. While all other references to defense witness testimony is second hand testimony.

First, during the testimony of Shatyra Rogers, when asked how long Ms. Poindexter (Amanda) and her family stayed at the home, Ms. Rogers stated "I would say no more than two months." 4 VRP at 504 (Exhibit K). When cross-examined, Ms. Rogers was asked by the prosecutor "And you think that Amanda and her kids came to stay with you all for about two to three months?" Ms. Rogers clarified "Yes. Well, probably two, but yes." 4 VRP at 524.

Second, Demetrius Rogers was asked when Ms. Poindexter and her children moved into the home? Mr. Rogers replied, "I can't say the exact date for sure, but I do recall that it was after my birthday in 2010, and my birthday is at the end of March, so I would say apparently April's time frame." 4 VRP at 540-41. Moments later Mr. Rogers was asked how long Ms. Poindexter and her children lived in the home? To this he responded "Couldn't have been more than a couple months at most. I do remember them being--I can't say for sure when they left, but I feel like it was before the summer started. Or I--I know the weather was nice, but it wasn't, like, midsummer. I believe I was still in school by the time they left." 4 VRP at 542. For Mr. Rogers, as a running start student taking classes at Clark College 4 VRP at 543-44, school would have ended the first week of June, therefore Ms. Poindexter and her children would have left in May. Making the timeline given by Mr. Rogers April to May, a maximum of two months.

Third, in reference to how long Ms. Poindexter and the complaining witness lived in the home Montreal Douglas testifies "I briefly lived in the house with them when I was about 19 years old for a month and a half of two." 4 VRP at 561. Shortly after Mr. Douglas would add " I

recall it was roughly around, like, the middle or end to March to about the beginning of May. She wasn't there for too long, about six weeks to two months," 4 VRP at 562. This time frame was reiterated again by Mr. Douglas, and he further added that it was a short period of time, a long time ago. 4 VRP at 572, 581-82.

Finally, Detective Hernandez was asked "And what did he indicate about that length of time?" to which she answered, "A couple months." A moment later Detective Hernandez added "Or three months. I don't know. I read it from the transcript a few minutes ago." 4 VRP at 484. This testimony is of Detective Hernandez being unsure and trying to figure out what length of time Petitioner told her that the complaining witness and her family lived in the home, during the March 1, 2016 investigative interview. Due to Detective Hernandez being unable to find the exact timeframe Petitioner states in the transcripts of the March 1, 2016 investigative interview, Detective Hernandez testimony is that Petitioner stated either two months or Petitioner stated three months. Since Detective Hernandez' testimony is uncertain it cannot be relied upon as an exact representation of Petitioner's statements. Later Detective Phelps acknowledged that Petitioner said two or three months and that this was an estimate of a timeframe that happened six or more years prior to the March 1, 2016 investigative interview. 4 VRP at 492-93. Detective Phelps would shortly after be referred again to the March 1, 2016 investigative interview transcripts and acknowledged "Okay. Yeah, at that point in the conversation he said it was less than two months." 4 VRP at 493. Additionally, the Petitioner would testify to a specific timeframe that is less than two months.

- Q. How long do you recall -- or if you recall -- did Amanda and her children live at the house with you?
- A. I do not have exact dates because it's been quite a while, but I usually try to navigate

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	things from my past based on, like, important dates. So my brother's birthday was March
1	23 I know that they were not there for my brother's birthday. And I got into a car accident
:	on June 8th of that year, and she that was a few days after she left the house.
2	Q. Okay. So sometime between March 23rd and June 8th?
	A. Yes, sir.
3	Q. But not necessarily that whole time?
	A. Say that again.
4	Q. I said, but not necessarily that whole time?
	A. That she was there? No. Not I'm not sure. I know for a fact she wasn't there on -
5	before my brother's birthday or on my brother's birthday. I know that she left a few days
	before my car accident.
6	Q. Okay. What, if anything, do you remember about the circumstances of her leaving?
:	A. It was tumultuous at best.
7	Q. All right. What was there a dispute?
	A. Yes, sir.
8	Q. Can you tell me what the what caused the dispute without telling me what anyone
	said specifically?
9	A. The dispute, it started over it started over the rent. She her my mother asked her
	for the rent they didn't agree on it. At the time I was not she she then gave me a call
10	because I was out and about. She was venting to me. I stopped her from venting because I
	felt like she was disrespecting my mother. She hung up on me. When I got home, she was
11	no longer there.
	She came back about a week and a half or two weeks later, and when she started

VRP at 727-28, 729, 736-37 (Exhibit L). Petitioner's defense was a) the complaining witness and

her family did not live with the Petitioner and his family for a year, instead they only lived with

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Petitioner and his family for 6-8 weeks b) the short amount of time the Petitioner had with the complaining witness in addition to 1. the amount of people in the home (8 people), 2. the limited space in the home (760 ft2 of living space), and 3. the schedules of everyone in the home, especially the Petitioners, makes it impossible for these crimes to have been committed and c) the way the two families separated was not on good terms, resulting in the 2010 police incident.

5 VRP at 740-44.

The Petitioner testified that the complaining witness and her family began living in the home after March 23. 2010 and the date this 2010 police incident occurred is before June 8, 2010, with the complaining witness and her family being out of the home a few weeks before this incident occurred. 4 VRP at 604-06. Ms. Poindexter also testifies that the complaining witness and her family had left the home before this incident occurred. 3 VRP at 347, 348, 365. The time difference, and thus the evidence in question, is significant because 1) more time allows for more opportunity 2) whoever's timeframe is accurate would more likely than not be considered more credible and 3) the defense's significantly shorter timeframe coupled with the testimony of all defense witnesses and portions of Ms. Poindexter's testimony, makes it impossible for any of these crimes to have occurred. The evidence in question is even more significant because this entire case was a credibility contest, with no physical evidence presented. Having a piece of evidence that corroborates and adds credibility to the defense theory over the prosecutions becomes even more important due to the case being a credibility contest. This creates "reasonable probability" that one juror might have reasonable doubt that these crimes were committed. Especially since the jurors in this case did not initially agree on a verdict for multiple charges during their deliberations (Exhibit F). Because it's reasonably probable that had the evidence been disclosed ——to the defense, Petitioner's trial would have been different,

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resulting in a different outcome. Therefore, the evidentiary suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.

e. Public Defender Misrepresentation

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Alternatively, Public Defender Staples misrepresented the Petitioner. Prosecutor Hayes intentionally failed to disclose documents favorable to the defense. Upon Public Defender Staples being made aware of the unavailability of documentation of the 2010 police incident that was in Detective Hernandez possession while investigating this case, before the case was given to the jury, he failed to due divulge to Petitioner the situation (Exhibit R) and file a motion to the trial court for its production or dismissal of the case under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Having knowledge of the undivulged information was not ineffective assistance of counsel, but a blatant misrepresentation of the Petitioner that inherently caused a miscarriage of justice and was crucial to be considered at trial allowing Petitioner his right to present a defense. Failing to divulge and file a motion to the trial court for the missing evidence's production or dismissal of the case under Brady, upon Prosecutor Hayes acknowledging the existence of the evidence and not being able to produce it to the defense, is unlikely to be part of a reasonable trial strategy. Particularly when the missing evidence is the only tangible, unbiased evidence from the time in question and it corroborates the Petitioner's story.

Additionally, the derelicted duties of Public Defender Staples' actions violated the Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC). Furthermore, Public Defender Staples derelicted duties is and was actually and substantially prejudicial to Petitioner's right to a fair trial.

This was discovered twenty-two months after Petitioner's convictions when Petitioner

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upon appeal requested his entire case file from Public Defender Staples. After twenty-two months of due diligence with discovering this critical and material documentation causing both Prosecutor Hayes and Public Defender Staples to exercise in bad faith in bringing defendant to trial in order to bring forth conviction. This issue is ripe for review and made under the fundamental fairness doctrine.

The missing evidence issue in this case involves evidence the state failed to preserve police report, 911 call recording, CAD log, dispatch call notes, officer notes and

The missing evidence issue in this case involves evidence the state failed to preserve police report, 911 call recording, CAD log, dispatch call notes, officer notes and any other evidence related to the 2010 police incident, specifically the documentation of the 2010 police incident that was in Detective Hernandez's possession while investigating this case. Case law is clear that the loss of any one of the materially exculpatory pieces of evidence, without a reasonable way for the defense to obtain comparable evidence, is sufficient to justify vacation and dismissal, and requires vacation and dismissal of the convictions against the Petitioner with prejudice. Because exculpatory evidence was lost from these sources, and the nature of the evidence left the Petitioner unable to obtain comparable evidence, defense was unable to present a complete defense. Because the value of the materially exculpatory evidence was apparent prior to its destruction, this Court need not consider whether the State acted in bad faith. Petitioner requests the convictions against him be vacated and dismissed with prejudice under both the Federal and Washington State Constitutions for due process violations for failure to preserve evidence.

- 4) Aggravating Factors
 - i. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n)

1	Petitioner still contends the trial testimony cannot support the jury finding of RCW
2	9.94A.535(3)(n) for the Petitioner's convictions in counts 2-5 (Exhibit H). RCW
3	9.94A.535(3)(n) states "The defendant used his or her position of trust, confidence, or
4	fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense." Petitioner
5	was charged with six counts across two distinctly separate charging periods that were
6	separated by up to two years. Count 1 had a charging period of January 1, 2008 -
7	December 31, 2008 (2008 charging period) and counts 2-6 had a charging period of
8	January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010 (2010 charging period) (Exhibit C). Prosecution
9	witness Amanda Poindexter, mother of the complaining witness, testified on cross-
10	examination that during the 2010 charging period, Petitioner had no responsibilities in
11	relation to her children (Exhibit J):
12	Q: Okay. So, and you testified about the arrangements that part of your motivation in
13	getting this night job was so that you didn't have to pay for childcare during the day?
14	A: And I didn't have to worry about anybody else watching my kids during the daytime.
15	Q: Right.
16	A: I could watch them during the daytime.
17	Q: Right. And you testified that school on school nights, bedtime's nine or you said
18	before school time or during school week bedtime for them was 9:00, and so they'd
19	already be in bed by the time you left for work?
20	A: Correct.
21	Q: Okay, Including Jazmyne?
22	A: Correct.

Q: Now, I was a little confused about you -- you didn't have any specific responsibilities that related to the kids, other than, say, not -- make sure the house didn't burn down?

A: Correct. 3 VRP at 368-69+

Petitioner was found guilty of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n) on counts 2-5, each of which was within the 2010 charging period. This guilty finding under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n) is contrary to the testimony of Ms. Poindexter. Any potential position of trust or confidence, as it relates to the 2008 charging period cannot reasonably be inferred to have carried over to the 2010 charging period after two years of no contact between the Petitioner and the complaining witness. And if somehow it can be inferred to have carried over from the 2008 charging period to the 2010 charging period, Petitioner was not convicted of count 1 the only count related to the 2008 charging period. Since the finding of guilt under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n) on counts 2-5 cannot be supported by the trial testimony, Petitioner requests the finding of guilt under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(n) be vacated.

ii. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g)

Petitioner's convictions in counts 2-5 (Exhibit H) cannot be supported by the evidence presented. RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) states "The offense was part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim under the age of eighteen years manifested by multiple incidents over as prolonged period of time." The term "prolonged period" is not defined in this statute, nor is a "prolonged period" specifically defined by any common understanding. Because a "prolonged period" is undefined it can reasonably mean a few days, a few months, or a few years, each interpretation would reasonably be a prolonged

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considered a "prolonged period" of time) State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 556-57, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)(two day period considered a "prolonged period" of time) See also State v. Brush, 183 Wn.2d 550, 557, 353 P.3d 213 (2015)(Noting "The Court of Appeals reviewed three prior Court of Appeals cases and concluded that they 'suggest[ed] that years are required' in order to find a 'prolonged period' of time." See State v. Ouigg, 72 Wn. App. 828, 841, 866 P.2d 655 (1994) (three-year period considered a "prolonged period" of time for one victim, but three days not long enough to be considered a "prolonged period" of time for another victim) State v. Duvall, 86 Wn. App. 871, 877, 940 P.2d 671 (1997)(two year period considered a "prolonged period" of time) State v. Schmeck, 98 Wn. App. 647, 651, 990 P.2d 472 (1999) (two year period considered a "prolonged period" of time)). "If, after examining the ordinary meaning of the statute's language and its context in the statutory scheme, more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we treat the statute as ambiguous." State v. Conover, 183 Wn.2d 706, 711-12, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015) (citing State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600-01, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). The term "prolonged period" in this statute is ambiguous allowing for multiple reasonable interpretations. The ambiguity caused by the term "prolonged period" constitutes an ambiguity that must be resolved using the rule of lenity.

period of time. See State v. Dodd, 120 Wn.2d 1, 27, 838 P.2d 86 (1992)(one day period

In criminal cases, the rule of lenity requires interpretation of the statute strictly in favor of the defendant. State v. Weatherwax, 188 Wn.2d 139, 155, 392 P.3d 1054 (2017)(citing Conover, 183 Wn.2d at 712) See also Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d at 601 (stating "the rule of lenity requires us to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant absent legislative intent to the contrary"). "The

underlying rationale for the rule of lenity is to place the burden on the legislature to be clear and definite in criminalizing conduct and establishing criminal penalties" Weatherwax, 188 Wn.2d at 155. (Citing State v. Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 710-11, 107 P.3d 728 (2005)). Therefore, RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) must be interpreted in the Petitioner's favor, due to the statute containing the ambiguous term "prolonged period."

Additionally, even if a "prolonged period" could be defined, the trial testimony does not specify when these crimes occurred. Without identifying when these crimes occurred there cannot be a determination of how long of a period of time these crimes occurred over. And without knowing how long of a period of time these crimes occurred over, there can be no determination that these crimes occurred over a "prolonged period" of time. Therefore, the trial testimony cannot be a basis for a finding of guilt under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g). Since the finding of guilt under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) on counts 2-5 cannot be supported by the trial testimony, Petitioner requests the finding of guilt under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(g) be vacated.

5) Due Process/Lack of Jurisdiction

Petitioner still contends that he did not receive proper due process due to the state's lack of jurisdiction during a significant portion of the charging period for each of the convictions, violating Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights under the United States Constitution and State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 975 P.2d 512 (1999). "[J]jurisdiction is comprised of only two components: jurisdiction over the person and subject matter jurisdiction." In re Marriage of Buecking, 179 Wn.2d 438, 447, 316 P.3d 999 (2013) (citing State v. Posey, 174 Wn.2d 131, 138, 272 P.3d 840 (2012)). The matter of jurisdiction determines if the courts have the authority to render a judgment in the case. Courts can only render judgment in cases within its jurisdiction. Washington State Courts jurisdiction is the State of Washington. No

Washington State Court has the authority to adjudicate matters outside of the State of Washington.

Petitioner was convicted of counts 2-5 during the charging period of January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010 (2010 charging period) (Exhibit C). Prosecution witness Amanda Poindexter, testifies that she and all of her children, including the complaining witness, moved from Alaska to the State of Washington on either March 10, 2010, or April 10, 2010. 3 VRP at 333-34. This establishes that the complaining witness was not in the State of Washington during the first two or three months of the 2010 charging period, but instead in Alaska. The period charged by the State cannot predate the jurisdiction of the State of Washington. Therefore, the State of Washington does not have jurisdiction over any portion of the charging period prior to the complaining witness entering the State of Washington's jurisdiction either on March 10, 2010 or April 10, 2010.

Petitioner was found guilty of counts 2-5 during the 2010 charging period (Exhibit C). On the jury verdict forms for counts 2-5, the jury did not specify when during the charging period each act making up the convictions in counts 2-5 occurred (Exhibits C and G). This means the jury could have found Petitioner guilty of acts occurring on January 21, 2010, February 16, 2010, March 6, 2010, or any other date between January 1, 2010 and March 10, 2010. Because any date between January 1, 2010, and March 10, 2010 would have occurred before the State of Washington had jurisdiction in this case, the convictions of counts 2-5 resulted in Petitioner possibly being illegally convicted in the State of Washington of acts occurring outside of the State of Washington's jurisdiction.

A case similar to the Petitioner's is State v. Aho, in which the defendant was convicted of crimes with a charging period that began with dates predating the effective statute. The jury did

not specify when the acts resulting in the convictions occurred, so it was possible the defendant's convictions was illegally based upon acts that occurred before the effective date of the statute.

State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 975 P.2d 512 (1999).

When comparing Aho to the Petitioner's case, the cases line up closely. In Aho, the issue was the charging period began with dates predating the statute's effective date. Similarly in the Petitioner's case, the issue is the charging period began with dates predating the State of Washington's jurisdiction (Exhibit C and E). In Aho, the jury never specified when the acts constituting the convictions occurred. Same in the Petitioner's case, the jury never specified when the acts constituting the convictions occurred. (Exhibit G) The Washington State Supreme Court ruled that "Because the jury did not identify when the acts that it found constituted the offense occurred, it is possible that Aho has been illegally convicted based upon an act or acts occurring before the effective date of the child molestation statute. Accordingly, Aho's convictions for child molestation violate due process." State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d at 744.

Similarly, because the jury did not identify when the acts that it found constituted the offense occurred, it is possible that Petitioner has been illegally convicted based upon an act or acts occurring before the State of Washington's jurisdiction began. Accordingly, Petitioner's convictions also violate due process.

Therefore, Petitioner requests the finding of guilt be vacated and dismissed with prejudice for violation of Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights and State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 975 P.2d 512 (1999).

CONCLUSION

2	In conclusion, Respondent State of Washington has failed to respond to any of the issues
3	listed in Petitioner's initial petition. And Petitioner has demonstrated that Petitioner's criminal
4	history and offender score was inaccurately determined as it included a washed-out conviction, a
5	conviction that was not and cannot be proven to be part of the Petitioner's criminal history, and
6	the failure of the trial court to do a proper same criminal conduct analysis. Petitioner has also
7	demonstrated that the destruction of Brady evidence by the prosecution prevented the Petitioner
8	from receiving a fair trial. Additionally, neither of the aggravating factors can be supported by
9	the trial testimony and therefore the State did not prove the aggravating factors beyond a
10	reasonable doubt. Further, Petitioner was possibly illegally convicted based upon an act or acts
11	occurring before the State of Washington's jurisdiction began violating Petitioner's Fourteenth
12	Amendment Due Process rights and State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 975 P.2d 512 (1999).
13	Petitioner therefore requests that his personal restraint petition be granted, and the remedy
14	recommended for each issue be applied.
15	
16	RESPECTFULLY submitted this 23 day of March 2023.
17	
18	DARYL 2068 RS
19	Daryl Rogers 412163
20	Airway Heights Corrections Center P.O. Box 2049

Airway Heights, WA 99001

1 2	EXHIBITS
3	Exhibit A – Motion Ruling by Commissioner Bearse (May 10, 2022)
5	Exhibit B - Perfection Letter (December 5, 2022)
6	Exhibit C - Judgment and Sentence
7	Exhibit D - Double Jeopardy Analysis
8	Exhibit E - Courts Instructions to The Jury
9	Exhibit F - Jury Question
ιo	Exhibit G - Jury Verdict Forms
L1	Exhibit H - Special Verdict Forms
12	Exhibit I - Verbatim Report Proceedings Volume II
L3	Exhibit J - Verbatim Report Proceedings Volume III
L4	Exhibit K - Verbatim Report Proceedings Volume IV
L 5	Exhibit L - Verbatim Report Proceedings Volume V
L6	Exhibit M - Verbatim Report Proceedings Volume VI
L7	Exhibit N - Daryl Rogers CAD Log Request Response
18	Exhibit O - John Visser CAD Log Request Response
19	Exhibit P - Affidavit of Jeff Staples
20	Exhibit Q - Email from DPA Colin Hayes to PD Jeff Staples (Exhibits N-Q)
21	are the first four exhibits from the CrR 8.3(b) Brady Motion
22	Exhibit R - Affidavit of DR

Exhibit A

Washington State Court of Appeals

Division Two



909 A Street, Suite 200, Tacoma, Washington 98402 Derek Byrne, Clerk/Administrator (253) 593-2970 (253) 593-2806 (Fax)

General Orders, Calendar Dates, and General Information at http://www.courts.wa.gov/courts OFFICE HOURS: 9-12, 1-4.

May 10, 2022

Daryl Rogers DOC#412163 Stafford Creek Corrections Center 191 Constantine Way Aberdeen, WA 98520

CASE #: 56791-1-II: Personal Restraint Petition of Daryl Rogers

Case Manager: Jodie

Counsel:

On the above date, this Court entered the following notation ruling:

A RULING BY COMMISSIONER BEARSE:

Petitioner has moved to voluntarily withdraw this Petition.

Petitioner originally filed this Petition as a CrR 7.8 motion in the trial court on March 18, 2022. The motion was timely filed in the trial court because Petitioner's direct appeal mandated less than a year earlier on April 19, 2021. RCW 10.73.090(3)(b). The trial court transferred the motion to this court for consideration as a Personal Restraint Petition.

Petitioner now asserts that given current restraints on his access to the prison law library, he needs additional time to research the law and issues required to prepare this matter as a Personal Restraint Petition and that withdrawal of the Petition without prejudice would assist this Court. But it is unclear from his filing whether Petitioner understands that withdrawal of this Petition would potentially render any later petition time-barred and subject to dismissal.

Accordingly, this Court denies the Motion to Withdraw this Petition, but this Court stays this matter until November 4, 2022, to allow Petitioner additional time to prepare and file a supplemental Petition. If Petitioner finds he needs additional time, he can file a Motion to Extend the Stay. Petitioner should note that any issues raised in the Supplemental Petition that were not raised in the original filing may potentially be subject to the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.090.

If, knowing of the time bar risk, Petitioner still wishes to voluntarily withdraw this Petition, he may file a new Motion to Voluntarily Withdraw the Petition.

Very truly yours,

Derek M. Byrne Court Clerk Exhibit B

Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two



909 A Street, Suite 200, Tacoma, Washington 98402 Derek Byrne, Clerk/Administrator (253) 593-2970 (253) 593-2806 (Fax)

General Orders, Calendar Dates, and General Information at http://www.courts.wa.gov/courts OFFICE HOURS: 9-12, 1-4.

December 5, 2022

Aaron Bartlett Attorney at Law 1013 Franklin St Vancouver, WA 98660-3039 aaron.bartlett@clark.wa.gov Daryl Rogers DOC#412163 Airway Heights Corr Cntr Airway Heights, WA 00000

Prosecuting Attorney Clark County Clark County Prosecuting Attorney PO Box 5000 1013 Franklin Street Vancouver, WA 98666-5000 cntypa.generaldelivery@clark.wa.gov

CASE #: 56791-1-II Personal Restraint Petition of Daryl Rogers

Case Manager: Jodie

Dear Aaron Bartlett and Daryl Rogers:

On February 3, 2023, this Court determined that Petitioner's CrR 7.8 Motion was properly transferred from the superior court and accepted as a Personal Restraint Petition. See CrR 7.8(c)(2); State v. Winston, 105 Wn. App. 318, 323-24, 19 P.3d 495 (2001).

As RAP 16.9 requires, the Respondent must, within 60 days of receiving this letter and the attached copy of the Petition, file and serve a Response to the Petition on Petitioner or Petitioner's counsel and this Court. If referring to the record of another proceeding answers the Petition, include a copy of the relevant parts of that record. If a brief supports the Petition, we have attached a copy, and the Respondent's Answering Brief is likewise due within 60 days. RAP 16.10. If the Respondent determines that the relief sought is appropriate, he should so stipulate. Petitioner may file a Reply Brief if done so within 30 days of receiving service of the Respondent's Brief. See RAP 16.10(a)(2).

This Court has initially waived Petitioner's filing fee based on his affidavit stating that he is indigent. Please include in the Response any information you possess with regard to indigency and state whether you will contest Petitioner's indigency claim. Additionally, please include in the Response or in a motion to this Court any information you possess with regard to whether the filing fee waiver is proper under RCW 4.24.430.

When the time for filing briefs has expired, the Chief Judge will consider the Petition and enter appropriate orders. The Court will defer any decisions on Motions for Appointment of Counsel and/or Motions for Production of the Record at Public Expense, if any, until we submit your Petition to the Chief Judge for consideration. RAP 16.11(a). Any request limited solely to the status of the Petition will be placed in the file without further action. You will be notified if the Court decides to call for additional briefs or portions of the record other than what the parties filed or decides that oral argument will be scheduled. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

CASE #: 56791-1-II Personal Restraint Petition of Daryl Rogers Page 2

Coursel must comply with GR 31(e) and omit personal identifiers from all documents filed in this Court. This rule provides that "parties shall not include, and if present shall redact" social security numbers, financial account numbers, and driver's license numbers. The rule specifies that the parties have this responsibility and the Court will not review filed documents for compliance with this rule. Because unsealed briefs and other documents are made available to the public on the Court's website and at our office, counsel must ensure that personal identifiers are removed or redacted.

Very truly yours,

Derek M. Byrne, Court Clerk

DMB: jlt

Exhibit C



Jeff Staples



FILED

JAN 23 2019 4:55 Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

Superior Court of Washington County of Clark

prosecuting attorney were present.

State of Washington, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3
vs.	Felony Judgment and Sentence Prison
DARYL ROGERS, aka DARYL CRAIG	☐ RCW 9.94A.507 Prison Confinement (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor)
ROGERS, Defendant.	(FJS) ⊠ Clerk's Action Required, para 2,1, 4.1, 4.3a, 4.3b,
SID: WA21967548	5.2, 5.3, 5.5 and 5.7
If no SID, use DOB	 □ Defendant Used Motor Vehicle □ Juvenile Decline □ Mandatory □ Discretionary
1. The court conducted a sentencing hearing this d	I. Hearing And an December 21,2015 ate: the defendant, the defendant's lawyer, and the (deputy)

II. Findings

2.1 Current Offenses: The defendant is guilty of the following offenses, based upon
☐ guilty plea ☐ jury-verdict 11/2/2018 ☐ bench trial:

Coi	unt Crime	RCW (w/subsection)	Class	Date of Crime
02	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.073	FA	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010
03	CHILD MOLESTATION IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.083	FA	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010
04	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.073	FA	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010
05	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.073	FA	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010

Class: FA (Felony-A), FB (Felony-B), FC (Felony-C)

(If the crime is a drug offense, include the type of drug in the second column.)

Additional current offenses are attached in Appendix 2.1a.

The defendant is a sex offender subject to indeterminate sentencing under RCW 9.94A.507.

The jury returned a special verdict or the court made a special finding with regard to the following:

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 1 of 16

	For crime(s) charged in Count(s) domestic violence as defined in RCW 10.99.020(5) was pled and proved.
	For crime(s) charged in Count(s) the defendant and the victim are "family or household members" as defined in RCW 10.99.020(3).
	For crime(s) charged in Count(s) the defendant and the victim are "family or household members" as defined in RCW 9A.36.041(4).
	The defendant used a firearm in the commission of the offense in Count RCW 9.94A.825, 9.94A.533.
	The defendant used a deadly weapon other than a firearm in committing the offense in Count RCW 9.94A.825, 9.94A.533.
	Count, is aggravated murder in the first degree committed while the defendant was under 16 years of age 16 or 17 years of age when the offense was committed.
	Count, was committed while the defendant was under 18 years of age and the time of confinement is over 20 years.
	The defendant engaged, agreed, offered, attempted, solicited another, or conspired to engage a victim of child rape or child molestation in sexual conduct in return for a fee in the commission of the offense in Count RCW 9.94A.839.
	In count an internet advertisement in which the victim of the crime was described or depicted was instrumental in facilitating the commission of the crime. RCW 9.68A.100, RCW 9.68A.101, or RCW 9.68A.102, Laws of 2013, ch. 9, §1.
	The offense was predatory as to Count RCW 9.94A.836.
H	The victim was under 15 years of age at the time of the offense in Count RCW 9.94A.837.
Ш	The victim was developmentally disabled, mentally disordered, or a frail elder or vulnerable adult at the time of the offense in Count RCW 9.94A.838, 9A.44.010.
	The defendant acted with sexual motivation in committing the offense in Count RCW 9.94A.835. This case involves kidnapping in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, or unlawful imprisonment as defined in chapter 9A.40 RCW, where the victim is a minor and the offender is not the minor's parent. RCW 9A.44.130.
	In count the defendant committed a robbery of a pharmacy as defined in RCW 18.64.011(21), RCW 9.94A
	Count, Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (VUCSA), RCW 69.50.401 and RCW 69.50.435, took place in a school, school bus, within 1000 feet of the perimeter of a school grounds or within 1000 feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school district; or in a public park, public transit vehicle, or public transit stop shelter; or in, or within 1000 feet of the perimeter of a civic center designated as a drug-free zone by a local government authority, or in a public housing project designated by a local governing authority as a drug-free zone.
	The defendant committed a crime involving the manufacture of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, when a juvenile was present in or upon the premises of manufacture in Count
	Count is a criminal street gang- related felony offense in which the defendant compensated, threatened, or solicited a minor in order to involve that minor in the commission of the offense. RCW 9.94A.833.
	Count is the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm and the defendant was a criminal street gang member or associate when the defendant committed the crime. RCW 9.94A.702, 9.94A.829.
	The defendant committed vehicular homicide vehicular assault proximately caused by driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or by operating a vehicle in a reckless manner. The offense is, therefore, deemed a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030.
GY	In Count, the defendant had (number of) passenger(s) under the age of 16 in the vehicle. RCW 9.94A.533.
	ony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) x Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense)

(RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017))
Page 2 of 16

لب	Count involves atterdefendant endangered one or mor RCW 9.94A.834.		lude a police value that the de					
		gency who value of the control	lefendant inter	g his or her of	icial duties	s at the tim	e of the as	sault,
	Count is a felony in the			defendant use	d a motor	vehicle.	RCW46.20	.285.
	The defendant has a chemical de	pendency tl	nat has contrib	uted to the off	ense(s). Ro	CW 9.94A	.607.	
	Reasonable grounds exist to believe the defendant is a mentally ill person as defined in RCW 71.24.025, and that this condition is likely to have influenced the offense. RCW 9.94B.080							
LJ	9A.36.120), the offender used force or means likely to result in death or intended to kill the victim and shall be subject to a mandatory minimum term of 5 years (RCW 9.94A.540).							
			same crimina	I conduct and	count as or	ne crime in	determini	ng the
 1	offender score (RCW 9.94A.589)							
	Other current convictions listed (list offense and cause number):	l under diff	erent cause n	umbers used	in calculat	ing the of	fender sco	re are
	Crime		Cause Num	ber	Court	(county &	state)	DV* Yes
1.					·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
		į						
*D\	: Domestic Violence was pled and							<u> </u>
	Additional current convictions lis attached in Appendix 2.1b.	aca unaci ai	iterent cause i	idilibers ased	ii caiculati	ng me one	siluci score	aic
2.2	Criminal History (RCW 9.94	1A.525):						
2.2	Criminal History (RCW 9.94 Crime	A.525): Date of Crime	Date of Sentence	Sentencing (County & S		A or J Adult,	Type of Crime	DV* Yes
1		Date of			State) Superior			
	Crime BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE ATTEMPTED RESIDENTIAL	Date of Crime	Sentence	Clark County & S Clark County Court (Clark, Clark County	Superior WA) Superior	Adult, Juv.	of Crime Violent class A felony Class C	
1	Crime BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE ATTEMPTED RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY	Date of Crime 4/4/2005 2/25/2007	Sentence 4/28/2005	Clark County & S	Superior WA) Superior	Adult, Juv.	of Crime Violent class A felony	
1 2 **D\\	Crime BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE ATTEMPTED RESIDENTIAL	Date of Crime 4/4/2005 2/25/2007 d proved ched in Appoint offense when the offense when	Sentence 4/28/2005 5/23/2007 endix 2.2. nile on commu , abo A.525), abo 20.	Clark County & S Clark County Court (Clark, Clark County Court (Clark, nity placemen ve, or in apper	Superior WA) Superior WA) Superior WA) t/communication 2.2, are endix 2.2, a	Adult, Juv. J ty custody e one offer	of Crime Violent class A felony Class C felony (adds one use for pur nted as por	yes point poses

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 3 of 16

2.3 Sentencing Da)ata:	a:
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Count No.	Offender Score	Serious- ness Level	Standard Range (not including enhancements)	Plus Enhancements*	Total Standard Range (including enhancements)	Maximum Term
02	g	XII	209 MONTHS to 274 MONTHS		209 MONTHS to 277 MONTHS	LIFE
03	8	х	129 MONTHS to 171 MONTHS	n/a	129 MONTHS to 171 MONTHS	LIFE
04	8	XII	209 MONTHS to 377 MONTHS	n/a	209 MONTHS to 27-7-MONTHS	LIFE
05	8	XII	204 MONTHS to 247 MONTHS	n/a	MONTHS to	LIFE

	03		_ ^u	277MONTHS	IV a	24-7-MONTHS	Ell E	
*	(F) F	Firearm, (D)	Other deadl	y weapons, (V) VUC	SA in a protecte	ed zone, (RPh) Robbery	of a pharmacy, (VH)	
	Veh.	Hom, see RC	CW 46.61.5	20, (JP) Juvenile pres	ent, (SM) Sexua	al motivation, RCW 9.9	4A.533(8), (SCF)	
						criminal street gang inv		
	enda	ngerment whi	ile attempti	ng to elude, (ALF) as	sault law enforce	ement with firearm, RC	CW 9.94A.533(12),	
) Passenger(s						
Г				entencing data is attac	hed in Appendi	x 2.3.		
						nmended sentencing ag	reements or nies	
		ents are at			orienucis, recon	michica schementg ag	recinents or pica	
ag	, eem	ents are ar	itaciieu [_]	as luliuws.			*	
2.4	4 🗂	Eventions	l Contone	n The court finds on	hetantial and as	mpelling reasons that ju	setify an exceptional	
۷.۰	*	sentence:	n Sentenc	e. The court finds so	ostantiai and co	impering reasons mar ju	istity an exceptional	
			a atom doud a	mmaa fan Caunt(a)				
				range for Count(s) range for Count(s)		<i>*</i>		
		above the	s Standard r	ange for Count(s)	instina in boot on	erved by imposition of the	ha avaantianal aantana	_
						otional sentence furthers	and is consistent with	
				stice and the purpose				
						ant, [] found by the cou	art after the defendant	
		waive	a jury triai,	, [] found by jury, by	special interrog	gatory.	1	
		within the	e standard	range for Count(s)		but served consecutive	ly to Count(s)	
		Findings of I	act and cor	iclusions of law are a	tached in Appe	ndix 2.4. 🔲 Jury's spe	cial interrogatory is	
						nmend a similar sentend		
						t finds that the same sen	itence would be	
		imposed if a	ny one of th	ne aggravating factors	is not upheld o	n appeal.		
2 6	5 A B	sility to Pou	Logol Eig	nancial Obligation	g			
۷.,						(a) (a) haaayaa		
				ent" pursuant to RCV				
						CW 10.101.010(3)(a).		
				voluntarily committed				
		≥ <				taxes, of one hundred to	wenty-five percent or	
		m 10 1		current federally esta				
						10(3)(a)-(c) and therefo		
						, and future ability to pa		
						ture of the burden that p	ayment of costs will	
	im			that the defendant's s				
				has the ability to pay	the legal financi	ial obligations imposed l	herein. RCW	
		10.01.16						
		☐ That the	defendant of	does not presently hav	e the ability to	pay, but is anticipated to	o be able to pay	
		financial	obligation	s in the future. RCW	10.01.160.			
		☐ That the	defendant of	does not have the abil	ity to pay and is	not anticipated to be at	ole to pay financial	
		obligatio	ns in the fu	ture. RCW 10.01.160				
		Other:					•	

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 4 of 16

	☐ The following extraordinary circumstances exist that make restitution inappropriate. (RCW 9.94A.753):
	☐ The defendant has the present means to pay costs of incarceration. RCW 9.94A.760.
2.6	Felony Firearm Offender Registration. The defendant committed a felony firearm offense as defined in RCW 9.41.010. The court considered the following factors: the defendant's criminal history. whether the defendant has previously been found not guilty by reason of insanity of any offense in this state or elsewhere. evidence of the defendant's propensity for violence that would likely endanger persons. other: The court decided the defendant should should not register as a felony firearm offender.
	III. Judgment
3.1 3.2	The defendant is <i>guilty</i> of the Counts and Charges listed in Paragraph 2.1. The court <i>dismisses</i> Counts 1 and 5 in the charging document without prejudice on motion of the State.
	IV. Sentence and Order
It is	ordered:
	Confinement. The court sentences the defendant to total confinement as follows: a) Confinement. RCW 9.94A.589. A term of total confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC):
	months on Count months on Count
	months on Count months on Count
	The confinement time on Count(s) contain(s) a mandatory minimum term of
	The confinement time on Count includes months as enhancement for firearm deadly weapon sexual motivation VUCSA in a protected zone manufacture of methamphetamine with juvenile present sexual conduct with a child for a fee.
	Actual number of months of total confinement ordered is: 277
	All counts shall be served concurrently, except for the portion of those counts for which there is an enhancement as set forth above at Section 2.3, and except for the following counts which shall be served consecutively:
	This sentence shall run consecutively with the sentence in the following cause number(s) (see RCW 9.94A.589(3)):
	Confinement shall commence immediately unless otherwise set forth here:
(b	Confinement. RCW 9.94A.507 (Sex Offenses only): The court orders the following term of confinement in the custody of the DOC:
	Count 02 minimum term 377 months maximum term Statutory Maximum Count 03 minimum term 171 months maximum term Statutory Maximum

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 5 of 16

	Count Count	04 05	minimum term minimum term	277	months months	maximum term maximum term	Statutory Maximum Statutory Maximum
(c) (Confineme	nt. RCW	10.95.030 (Aggravate	ed murder	and under	age 18.) The cour	rt orders the following:
	Count		minimum term:			_ maximum term:	·
(d)			wed: The defendant says solely under this ca				red prior to sentencing if il shall compute time
(e)	and is like sentence a on common Section 4.	ely to qual at a work e unity custo 2. Violatio	ify for work ethic pro thic program. Upon dy for any remaining	gram. The completion of the completion of the completion of the contract of th	e court reco on of work e total confine	mmends that the cethic program, the ment, subject to the	defendant shall be released
			y. (To determine whi see RCW 9.94A.701)		es are eligib	le for or required	for community placement
			be on community pl		or communi	ty custody for the	longer of:
			ly release. RCW 9.9 sed by the court, as for)(2); or	•	•
	Count(s) _ Count(s) _ unlawful p	possession	, 36 months for , 18 months for , 12 months (fo of a firearm by a stro , months	Violent (r crimes a eet gang n	Offenses Igainst a per nember or a	son, drug offenses	, or offenses involving the
			For count(s) 02, 03, ased from total confi				77, for any period of time utory maximum.
	The total t		arceration and comm	unity sup	ervision/cus	stody shall not exc	eed the statutory maximum
ass cor cor (7) cor DC det	signed com mmunity re nsume cont ntrolled sub pay super mpliance w DC; and (10 fendant's re mmunity cu	munity co estitution (concluded sub- postances we vision fees with the ord of abide by esidence lo ustody. For	service); (3) notify D stances except pursua hile on community co as determined by DC lers of the court; (9) for any additional condi- scation and living arra	rected; (2 OC of any ant to law ustody; (6 OC; (8) pe or sex off titions imp angement nced under	e) work at Doy change in fully issued in not own, uperform affirm fenses, submosed by DO is are subjecter RCW 9.9	OC-approved eduction defendant's addressible prescriptions; (5) use, or possess fire native acts as request to electronic most conder RCW 9.9 to the prior approximation of the prior a	cation, employment and/or ss or employment; (4) not not unlawfully possess
			ring the period of sup	pervision	the defendar	nt shall:	
	•		me alcohol.				
	have no co	ontact with	:	ed geogra	nhical houn	dary to wit:	
			•				
	not reside zone). RC			or ground	ls of a publi	c or private school	(community protection
Felony	Judgment	and Sen	tence (FJS) (Prison	 ı)			

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 6 of 16

	☐ partici ☐ partici	pate in an educat pate in the follow	tion program about the negative costs of prostitution. wing crime-related treatment or counseling services:	
	ang 🔲	ger management,	for treatment for domestic violence chemical depender and fully comply with all recommended treatment.	
	Combi	y with the follow	ving crime-related prohibitions:	
	Other of	conditions: all co	onditions listed in Appendix A (attached).	·
	other cond	litions (including	I under RCW 9.94A.507, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Is g electronic monitoring if DOC so recommends). In an emergor a period not to exceed seven working days.	
	must notif	y DOC and the	If any court orders mental health or chemical dependency treatefendant must release treatment information to DOC for the dion. RCW 9.94A.562.	
	(D) If the of confine		nitted the above crime(s) while under age 18 and is sentenced to	o more than 20 years
	<i>(i)</i>	crimes, and the committed a depetition is file	e defendant's conviction is not for aggravated first degree murd e defendant has not been convicted of a crime committed after lisqualifying serious infraction as defined by DOC in the 12 m d, the defendant may petition the Indeterminate Sentence Revi	he or she turned 18 or onths before the
	(ii)	Review Board DOC for a per	nt is released early because the petition was granted or by other, the defendant will be subject to community custody under the siod of time determined by the Board, up to the length of the cou. The defendant will be required to comply with any conditions in	supervision of the rt-imposed term of
	(iii)		nt violates the conditions of community custody, the Board may or up to the remainder of the court-imposed term of incarceration	
1.3a	Legal Fin	ancial Obligatio	ons: The defendant shall pay to the clerk of this court:	
IAS.	S CODE			
CV	/	\$ 500.00	Victim assessment (mandatory)	RCW 7.68.035
DI	/	\$	Domestic Violence assessment	RCW 10.99.080
		\$	Violation of a DV protection order (\$15 mandatory fine)	RCW 26.50.110
7RC			Criminal filing fee, (mandatory, however waive if Cour	t found defendant to
		V	be indigent pursuant to RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c) in sec	ction 2.5 above).
			RCW 36.18.020.	
CRC		\$	Court costs, including RCW 9.94A.760, 9.94A.505, 10.01	.160, 10.46.190
			Witness costs \$ WFR	
			Sheriff service fees \$ SFR/SFS/SFW/WRF	•
			Jury demand fee \$ JFR	
			Extradition costs \$ EXT	

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 7 of 16

PUB	\$	Other Fees for co	\$ ourt appointed attorney	,	RCW 9.94A.760
WFR	\$	Court appo	ointed defense expert a	nd other defense costs	RCW 9.94A.760
FCM/MTH	\$	☐ VUCSA	CW 9A.20.021 A fine RCW 69.50.430 and due to indigency)	
CDF/LDI/FCD NTF/SAD/SDI	\$	Drug enfor	rcement Fund # 🔲 10	15 🔲 1017 (TF)	RCW 9.94A.760
CLF	\$	Crime lab	fee 🔲 suspended due	to indigency	RCW 43.43.690
Old	\$		ction fee (mandatory in this state).	unless DNA previously	collected by prior RCW 43.43.7541
FPV	\$	Specialized	forest products		RCW 76.48.140
PPI	\$ \$	reduced by RCW 9A. Fee for Poss	no more than two third 40.100, 9A.88.120, 9.6 session of Depictions of	f a Minor Engaged in Sex	ity to pay.) cually Explicit Conduct
		•	e for each separate conv		RCW 9.68A.070
DEF	\$	Emergency	response costs (\$1,00	0 maximum, \$2,500 max	RCW 38.52.430
		Agency:			
RTN/RJN	\$607.34	(Name and	to: <u>CRIME VICTIMS</u> Addressaddress may e Court's office.)	COMPENSATION PR be withheld and provide	OGRAM (\$607.34) ed confidentially to
	\$	Total			RCW 9.94A.760
later ord hearing S s i The	der of the court. A the hall be set by the p s scheduled for defendant waives itution Schedule a	n agreed responsecutor. any right to ttached.	be present at any restit	egal financial obligations, entered. RCW 9.94A.753 cution hearing (sign initia	3. A restitution (date).
	other defendant	ove snam be	paid jointly and severa	Victim's name	Amount-\$
Mante OI	onter desendant		Cause Humber	4 Ictim 5 name	/ Minount-w
Deduction. All payrestablished	RCW 9.94A.7602 ments shall be mad by DOC or the cle	, RCW 9.94 te in accordant ork of the co	A.760(8). ance with the policies ourt, commencing imme	shall immediately issue a of the clerk of the court are diately, unless the court	nd on a schedule specifically sets forth
the rate her 9.94A.760.		pe	r month commencing_		RCW

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 8 of 16

	The defendant shall report to the clerk of the court or as directed by the clerk of the court to provide financial and other information as requested. RCW 9.94A.760(7)(b).
	The court orders the defendant to pay costs of incarceration at the rate of \$ per day, (actual costs not to exceed \$100 per day). (JLR) RCW 9.94A.760. (This provision does not apply to costs of incarceration collected by DOC under RCW 72.09.111 and 72.09.480.).
	The financial obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date of the judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments. RCW 10.82.090. An award of costs on appeal against the defendant may be added to the total legal financial obligations. RCW 10.73.160.
4.3t	Electronic Monitoring Reimbursement. The defendant is ordered to reimburse (name of electronic monitoring agency) at , for the cost of pretrial electronic
	monitoring in the amount of \$ for the cost of pretrial electronic
4.4	DNA Testing. The defendant shall have a biological sample collected for purposes of DNA identification analysis and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. The appropriate agency shall be responsible for obtaining the sample prior to the defendant's release from confinement. This paragraph does not apply if it is established that the Washington State Patrol crime laboratory already has a sample from the defendant for a qualifying offense. RCW 43.43.754.
	☐ HIV Testing. The defendant shall submit to HIV testing. RCW 70.24.340.
4.5	No Contact:
	The defendant shall not have contact with <u>J.R.O.</u> (female, <u>DOB 6/30/1999</u>) including, but not limited to, personal, verbal, telephonic, written or contact through a third party for <u>life</u> (which does not exceed the maximum statutory sentence).
	The defendant is excluded or prohibited from coming within:
	☐ 500 feet ☐ 880 feet ☒ 1000 feet of:
	⊠ home/ residence ⊠ work place ⊠ school
	(other location(s)) person
	other location
	for <u>life</u> (which does not exceed the maximum statutory sentence).
	A separate Domestic Violence No-Contact Order, Antiharassment No-Contact Order, or Sexual Assault Protection Order is filed concurrent with this Judgment and Sentence.
4.6	Other:
4 79	OCC T : 14 O 1
4.7	Off-Limits Order. (Known drug trafficker). RCW 10.66.020. The following areas are off limits to the defendant while under the supervision of the county jail or Department of Corrections:
	Exoneration: The Court hereby exonerates any bail, bond and/or personal recognizance conditions. if not on Community Custody for supervision.
	ny Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison)

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 9 of 16

V. Notices and Signatures

- 5.1 Collateral Attack on Judgment. If you wish to petition or move for collateral attack on this Judgment and Sentence, including but not limited to any personal restraint petition, state habeas corpus petition, motion to vacate judgment, motion to withdraw guilty plea, motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment, you must do so within one year of the final judgment in this matter, except as provided for in RCW 10.73.100. RCW 10.73.090.
- 5.2 Length of Supervision. If you committed your offense prior to July 1, 2000, you shall remain under the court's jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a period up to 10 years from the date of sentence or release from confinement, whichever is longer, to assure payment of all legal financial obligations unless the court extends the criminal judgment an additional 10 years. If you committed your offense on or after July 1, 2000, the court shall retain jurisdiction over you, for the purpose of your compliance with payment of the legal financial obligations, until you have completely satisfied your obligation, regardless of the statutory maximum for the crime. RCW 9.94A.760 and RCW 9.94A.505(5). The clerk of the court has authority to collect unpaid legal financial obligations at any time while you remain under the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of your legal financial obligations. RCW 9.94A.760(4) and RCW 9.94A.753(4).
- 5.3 Notice of Income-Withholding Action. If the court has not ordered an immediate notice of payroll deduction in Section 4.1, you are notified that the Department of Corrections (DOC) or the clerk of the court may issue a notice of payroll deduction without notice to you if you are more than 30 days past due in monthly payments in an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable for one month. RCW 9.94A.7602. Other income-withholding action under RCW 9.94A.760 may be taken without further notice. RCW 9.94A.7606.
- 5.4 Community Custody Violation.
 - (a) If you are subject to a violation hearing and DOC finds that you committed the violation, you may receive a sanction of up to 30 days of confinement. RCW 9.94A.633(1).
 - (b) If you have not completed your maximum term of total confinement and you are subject to a violation hearing and DOC finds that you committed the violation, DOC may return you to a state correctional facility to serve up to the remaining portion of your sentence. RCW 9.94A.633(2)(a).
- 5.5a Firearms. You may not own, use or possess any firearm, and under federal law any firearm or ammunition, unless your right to do so is restored by the court in which you are convicted or the superior court in Washington State where you live, and by a federal court if required. You must immediately surrender any concealed pistol license. (The clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the defendant's driver's license, identicard, or comparable identification to the Department of Licensing along with the date of conviction or commitment.) RCW 9.41.040 and RCW 9.41.047.
- 5.5b Felony Firearm Offender Registration. The defendant is required to register as a felony firearm offender.

 The specific registration requirements are in the "Felony Firearm Offender Registration" attachment.
- 5.6 Sex and Kidnapping Offender Registration Laws of 2010, ch. 367 § 1, 10.01.200.
 - 1. General Applicability and Requirements: Because this crime involves a sex offense or kidnapping offense involving a minor as defined in RCW 9A.44.128, you are required to register.

If you are a resident of Washington, you must register with the sheriff of the county of the state of Washington where you reside. You must register within three business days of being sentenced unless you are in custody, in which case you must register at the time of your release with the person designated by the agency that has jurisdiction over you. You must also register within three business days of your release with the sheriff of the county of the state of Washington where you will be residing.

While in custody, if you are approved for partial confinement, you must register when you transfer to partial confinement with the person designated by the agency that has jurisdiction over you. You must also register within three business days from the end of partial confinement or release from confinement with the sheriff of the county where you reside.

If you are not a resident of Washington but you are a student in Washington or you are employed in Washington or you carry on a vocation in Washington, you must register with the sheriff of the county of your

school, place of employment, or vocation. You must register within three business days of being sentenced unless you are in custody, in which case you must register at the time of your release with the person designated by the agency that has jurisdiction over you. You must also register within three business days of your release with the sheriff of the county of your school, where you are employed, or where you carry on a vocation.

- 2. Offenders Who are New Residents, Temporary Residents, or Returning Washington Residents: If you move to Washington or if you leave this state following your sentencing or release from custody but later move back to Washington, you must register within three business days after moving to this state. If you leave this state following your sentencing or release from custody but later while not a resident of Washington you become employed in Washington, carry on a vocation in Washington, or attend school in Washington, you must register within three business days after starting school in this state or becoming employed or carrying out a vocation in this state. If you are visiting and intend to reside or be present 10 or more days in Washington, then you must register the location where you plan to stay or your temporary address with the sheriff of each county where you will be staying within three business days of your arrival.
- 3. Change of Residence Within State: If you change your residence within a county, you must provide, by certified mail, with return receipt requested or in person, signed written notice of your change of residence to the sheriff within three business days of moving. If you change your residence to a new county within this state, you must register with the sheriff of the new county within three business days of moving. Also within three business days, you must provide, by certified mail, with return receipt requested or in person, signed written notice of your change of address to the sheriff of the county where you last registered.
- 4. Leaving the State or Moving to Another State: If you move to another state, or if you work, carry on a vocation, or attend school in another state you must register a new address, fingerprints, and photograph with the new state within three business days after establishing residence, or after beginning to work, carry on a vocation, or attend school in the new state. If you move out of the state, you must also send written notice within three business days of moving to the new state or to a foreign country to the county sheriff with whom you last registered in Washington State.
- 5. Travel Outside the United States: If you intend to travel outside the United States, you must provide signed written notice of the details of your plan to travel out of the country to the sheriff of the county where you are registered. Notice must be provided at least 21 days before you travel. Notice may be provided to the sheriff by certified mail, with return receipt requested, or in person.

If you cancel or postpone this travel, you must notify the sheriff within three days of canceling or postponing your travel or on the departure date you provide in your notice, whichever is earlier.

If you travel routinely across international borders for work, or if you must travel unexpectedly due to a family or work emergency, you must personally notify the sheriff at least 24 hours before you travel. You must explain to the sheriff in writing why it is impractical for you to comply with the notice required by RCW 9A.44.130(3).

- 6. Notification Requirement When Enrolling in or Employed by a Public or Private Institution of Higher Education or Common School (K-12): You must give notice to the sheriff of the county where you are registered within three business days:
- i) before arriving at a school or institution of higher education to attend classes;
- ii) before starting work at an institution of higher education; or
- iii) after any termination of enrollment or employment at a school or institution of higher education.
- 7. Registration by a Person Who Does Not Have a Fixed Residence: Even if you do not have a fixed residence, you are required to register. Registration must occur within three business days of release in the county where you are being supervised if you do not have a residence at the time of your release from custody. Within three business days after losing your fixed residence, you must send signed written notice to the sheriff of the county where you last registered. If you enter a different county and stay there for more than 24 hours, you will be required to register with the sheriff of the new county not more than three business days after

registered. The weekly report sl normal business hours. You mu it to the county sheriff upon req	hall be on a day specified by the coust keep an accurate accounting of the coust. The lack of a fixed residence evel and shall make the offender s	to the sheriff of the county where you are bunty sheriff's office, and shall occur during where you stay during the week and provide is a factor that may be considered in ubject to disclosure of information to the	e
application to the county sheriff before the entry of an order gran submit a copy of the order to the	f of the county of your residence an nting the name change. If you rece	nange, you must submit a copy of the and to the state patrol not fewer than five day eive an order changing your name, you must residence and to the state patrol within	
of which a motor vehicle was (ACR) to the DOL, which mu	used. Clerk's Action -The clerk ist revoke the Defendant's driver's	ount is a felony in the commissic shall forward an Abstract of Court Recors license. RCW 46.20.285. Findings for hicular Assault, or Vehicular Homicide	on d
Within two hours after dri concentration of breath or		of a vehicle, the defendant had an alcohol	
No BAC test result.	ant refused to take a test offered t	oursuant to PCW 46 20 308	
Drug Related The defende	lant refused to take a test offered pant was under the influence of or a	affected by any drug.	
THC level was with		anovou oy any ang.	
Passenger under age 16. T	he defendant committed the offer	nse while a passenger under the age of sixt	een
was in the vehicle.	7 	. ** 1	
Vehicle Info.: Commercial Veh.; [16 Passenger Ven.; Hazmai	t ven.	
[Imitation drugs], and the de under RCW 9.41.040 [unlaw time of the offense OR (c) a the age of 18 at the time of the offense while armed with a f of chapter 66.44, 69.41, 69.5	fendant was under 21 years of age ful possession of firearm], and the violation under RCW chapter 66. The offense, AND the court finds the irearm, an unlawful possession of 0, or 69.52 RCW.	end drug], 69.50 [VUCSA], or 69.52 at the time of the offense OR (b) a violate defendant was under the age of 18 at the 44 [Alcohol], and the defendant was under the defendant previously committed an a firearm offense, or an offense in violation ourt Record (ACR) to the DOL, which makes the time of time of time of time of the time of time	on
		Jan. 23, 2019	
Done in Open Court and in the p	presence of the defendant this date	Jan. 23, 2019	
	EF.	Mawy	
~ 40 1	Judge/	Print Name Robert Lewis	
(2I/I)		÷.	
uge o		DAPULDIKEDS	
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney	Attorney for Defendant	Defendant	
WSBA No. 35387	WSBA No. 40738	Print Name:	
Print Name: Colin P. Hayes	Print Name: Jeff Staples	DARYL ROGERS	
Andrew Commission and Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission Commission			

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Voting Rights Statement: I acknowledge that I have lost registered to vote, my voter registration will be cancelled	my right to vote because of this felony conviction. If I am
confinement in the custody of DOC and not subject to co	not under the authority of DOC (not serving a sentence of mmunity custody as defined in RCW 9.94A.030). I must rebe revoked if I fail to comply with all the terms of my legal legal financial obligations.
discharge issued by the sentencing court, RCW 9.94A.63 the right, RCW 9.92.066; c) a final order of discharge iss 9.96.050; or d) a certificate of restoration issued by the g is a class C felony, RCW 29A.84.660. Registering to vo 29A.84.140.	overnor, RCW 9.96.020. Voting before the right is restored
Defendant's signature:	
I am a certified or registered interpreter, or the court has a language, which and Sentence for the defendant into that language.	Yound me otherwise qualified to interpret, in the
I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the sta	ate of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.
Signed at Vancouver, Washington on (date):	
Interpreter	Print Name
I, Scott G. Weber, Clerk of this Court, certify that the fo Sentence in the above-entitled action now on record in thi	regoing is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment and is office.
Witness my hand and seal of the said Superior Cour	t affixed this date:
Clerk of the Court of said county and state, by:	, Deputy Clerk

Identification of the Defendant

DARYL ROGERS

17-1-00097-3

SID No: WA21967548 (If no SID take fingerprint card for State	Date of Birth: The Patrol)
FBI No. 47231DC7	Local ID No.
PCN No.	Other
Alias name, DOB: , aka DARYL CRAIG ROG	GERS, DARYL CRAIG ROGERS
Race: B	Ethnicity: Sex: M
The defendant's signature:	Dated: Dated: Dated: Of Washing Course
Left four fingers taken simultaneously	Left Right Right four fingers taken singulations of the Right four fingers taken singulations of the Right Right four fingers fingers for the Right four fingers fingers fingers for the Right four fingers fingers for the Right four fingers fingers for the Right four fingers fing

Felony Judgment and Sentence (FJS) (Prison) (Sex Offense and Kidnapping of a Minor Offense) (RCW 9.94A.500, .505)(WPF CR 84.0400 (12/2017)) Page 14 of 16

"APPENDIX A"

CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE AND COMMUNITY CUSTODY

- You shall commit no law violations. You shall notify your community corrections officer within 48
 hours of any arrest or citation for an alleged violation of the law.
- 2. You shall not have any direct or indirect contact with the victim(s), including but not limited to personal, verbal, telephonic, written, or through a third person. You shall not come within one-thousand (1,000) feet of victim's person, home/residence, work place, school, or place of employment. These conditions are for the statutory maximum sentence of <u>life</u>, and shall also apply during any period of incarceration.

Additionally: a Sexual Assault Protection Order for the maximum period per RCW 7.90.150(6)(c).

Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 26.50 RCW and will subject a violator to arrest; any assault, drive-by shooting, or reckless endangerment that is a violation of this order is a felony. You can be arrested even if any person protected by the order invites or allows you to violate the order's prohibitions. You have the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from violating the order's provisions. Only the court can change the order.

- 3. You shall not enter into or frequent video game parlors, playgrounds, parks, amusement parks, skate parks, public swimming pools, skating rinks, school grounds, malls, and any other areas routinely used by minors under the age of sixteen years as areas of play/recreation.
- 4. You shall not have any contact with minors under the age of sixteen years without prior approval of DOC and your sexual deviancy treatment provider.
- 5. You shall not possess or consume alcohol without prior approval from DOC and all treatment providers. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(e).
- You shall submit to urine, breath, PBT/BAC, or other monitoring whenever requested to do so by your community corrections officer to monitor compliance with abstention from alcohol and nonprescribed controlled substances.
- 7. You shall obtain an evaluation for sexual deviancy conducted by a Washington State certified sexual deviancy treatment provider approved by DOC. You shall comply and cooperate with any recommended treatment. You shall not change sex offender treatment providers without notifying DOC and, if DOC objects to the change, then you must first obtain court approval after a hearing. "Cooperate with" means you shall follow all treatment directives, accurately report all sexual thoughts, feelings and behaviors in a timely manner and cease all deviant sexual activity. You shall comply with all requirements, restrictions, and rules of all recommended treatment program(s).
- 8. The sex offender therapist shall submit quarterly reports on your progress in treatment to DOC. The quarterly report shall reference the treatment plan and include the following, at a minimum: dates of attendance, your compliance with requirements, treatment activities, and your relative progress in treatment.

Page FELONY SEX OFFENSE - ISRB

Updated Dec. 2018

CLARK COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY CHILDREN'S JUSTICE CENTER PO BOX 61992 VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON 98866 (360) 397-6002 (OFFICE) (360) 397-6016 (FAX)

- You shall, at your own expense, submit to polygraph examinations at the request of DOC. Such exams will be used to ensure compliance with the conditions of community custody and of your treatment program(s).
- 10. You shall not possess, use, access, or view any sexually explicit material as defined by RCW 9.68.130(2) unless given prior approval by DOC and your sexual deviancy treatment provider.
- You shall not hold any position of trust or authority over minor children without prior approval of DOC and your sexual deviancy treatment provider.
- 12. You shall not enter into a dating relationship with another person who has minor children in their care or custody without prior approval of DOC and your sexual deviancy treatment provider.
- 13. You shall register as a sex offender as required under RCW 9A.44.130.
- 14. You may not reside within eight hundred eighty (880) feet of the facilities and grounds of a public or private school. RCW 9.94A.030; 9.94A.703(1)(c).
- 15. As soon as possible after sentencing, you shall undergo pretest counseling, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) testing, and posttest counseling at the direction of the Clark County Health Department as required by RCW 70.24.340. You shall contact the Clark County Health Department after sentencing or release from custody, whichever occurs last, to schedule an appointment for the counseling and testing. To schedule this appointment, you may call (360)397-8086.
- 16. You shall comply with any conditions imposed by DOC under RCW 9.94A.704. RCW 9.94A.703(1)(b).
- 17. You shall comply with all conditions listed in RCW 9.94A.703(2).

Page FELONY SEX OFFENSE - ISRB

Updated Dec. 2018

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON - COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,

NO. 17-1-00097-3

ν,

DARYL ROGERS.

Defendant.

WARRANT OF COMMITMENT TO STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS

SID: WA21967548 DOB

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, to the Sheriff of Clark County, Washington, and the State of Washington, Department of Corrections, Officers in charge of correctional facilities of the State of Washington:

GREETING:

WHEREAS, the above-named defendant has been duly convicted in the Superior Court of the State of Washington of the County of Clark of the crime(s) of:

COUNT	CRIME	RCW	DATE OF CRIME
02	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.073	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010
03	CHILD MOLESTATION IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.083	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010
04	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.073	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010
05	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	9A.44.073	1/1/2010 to 12/31/2010

and Judgment has been pronounced and the defendant has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in such correctional institution under the supervision of the State of Washington, Department of Corrections, as shall be designated by the State of Washington, Department of Corrections pursuant to RCW 72.02, all of which appears of record; a certified copy of said judgment being endorsed hereon and made a part hereof,

NOW, THIS IS TO COMMAND YOU, said Sheriff, to detain the defendant until called for by the transportation officers of the State of Washington, Department of Corrections, authorized to conduct defendant to the appropriate facility, and this is to command you, said Superintendent of the appropriate facility to receive defendant from said officers for confinement, classification and placement in such correctional facilities under the supervision of the State of Washington, Department of Corrections, for a term of confinement of:

WARRANT OF COMMITMENT

COUNT	CRIME	TERM
02	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	277 Months
03	CHILD MOLESTATION IN THE FIRST DEGREE	17 Months
04	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	277 Months
05	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	277 Months

05	RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE	277 Months
These term	is shall be served concurrently to each other unless specified l	herein:
Departmen	t of Corrections to determine any credit for time served.	·
confinemen) of confinement (sentence) imposed herein shall be served on t (sentence) which the defendant may be sentenced to under ourt unless otherwise specified herein:	onsecutively to any other term of any other cause in either District Court or
And these p	presents shall be authority for the same.	
HEREIN F	AIL NOT.	
W	TTNESS, Honorable	woo
JUDGE OF	THE SUPERIOR COURT AND THE SEAL THEREOF THI	IS DATE: 1/23/19.
	SCOTT G. WE	EBER, Clerk of the
	Clark County	
	//	' . /)
	By:	See In the Sur
		Deputy Of the Supering of the

Exhibit D

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FILED

JAN 23 2019 4:43

Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

NO. 17-1-00097-3

10

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND SCORING

DARYL ROGERS,

Defendant.

12

and Jun-23,2019

On December 21, 2018, a sentencing hearing was held in this Court before the Honorable Robert Lewis. The Defendant was present with his attorney of record, Jeff Staples. Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Colin P. Hayes represented the State. The Court considered the testimony of Nancy Druckenmiller at the sentencing hearing, the evidence admitted at the sentencing hearing, the testimony and exhibits admitted at trial, and the verdicts of the jury. This court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

2021

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

2223

1.1

The evidence, to-convict instructions, elections by the State in closing argument to correspond specific incidents with specific counts, and the verdicts of the jury established

24

that the Counts II - V cover three distinct incidents, divided as follows:

2526

(1) Counts II (Rape Child 1) and III (Child Molestation 1), relating to the incident on the couch in the living room where the Defendant got on top of the victim, with his front side against her back side, and rubbed his penis back and forth between the victim's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Double Jeopardy and Scoring 1 of #3

Clark County Prosecuting Attorney 1013 Franklin St. / P.O. Box 5000 Vancouver, WA 98666-5000 (360) 397-2261 / FAX: (360) 397-2230

0-000000091

1		Count No.	Offender Score	Serious- ness Level	Standard Range (not including enhancements)	Plus Enhancements*	Total Standard Range (including enhancements)	Maximum Term
2		02	%	XII	months	247- n/a	250-578 209-27 months	LIFE
3		03	જ	х	129-171 months	n/a	129-171 months	LIFE
4		04	B	XII	240 209-	77 n/a	mondhs	LIFE
5		05	В	XII	mondhs	n/a	mondhs	77 LIFE
7		Ente	ered this	23	day of January,	2019.		
8			-			DA		
9					Sup	erior Court Judg	ge Robert Lewis	
10	Appr	oved; p	oreșented l	oy:		Approved as	to form only:	
11		Cd/	1			λ		
12	Sr. D	Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Attorney for Defendant						
13	Colin P. Hayes, WSBA# 35387 Jeff Staples, WSBA#							
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Exhibit E

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NOV 02 2018 11510

Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	
Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
(-	X. Whervin
SU	JPERIOR COURT JUDGE
DATED this/ ³⁷ day of	November, 2018.

INSTRUCTION NO. ______

It is your duty to decide the facts in this case based upon the evidence presented to you during this trial. It also is your duty to accept the law from my instructions, regardless of what you personally believe the law is or what you personally think it should be. You must apply the law from my instructions to the facts that you decide have been proved, and in this way decide the case.

Keep in mind that a charge is only an accusation. The filing of a charge is not evidence that the charge is true. Your decisions as jurors must be made solely upon the evidence presented during these proceedings.

The evidence that you are to consider during your deliberations consists of the testimony that you have heard from witnesses and the exhibits that I have admitted during the trial. If evidence was not admitted or was stricken from the record, then you are not to consider it in reaching your verdict.

Exhibits may have been marked by the court clerk and given a number, but they do not go with you to the jury room during your deliberations unless they have been admitted into evidence. The exhibits that have been admitted will be available to you in the jury room.

One of my duties has been to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Do not be concerned during your deliberations about the reasons for my rulings on the evidence. If I have ruled that any evidence is inadmissible, or if I have asked you to disregard any evidence, then you must not discuss that evidence during your deliberations or consider it in reaching your verdict. Do not speculate whether the evidence would have favored one party or the other.

To convict the defendant of the crime of Child Molestation in the First Degree as charged in Count 1, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about or between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008, the defendant had sexual contact with J.R.O.;
- (2) That J.R.O. was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual contact and was not married to the defendant:
 - (3) That J.R.O. was at least thirty-six months younger than the defendant; and
 - (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

To convict the defendant of the crime of Child Molestation in the First Degree as charged in Count 3, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about or between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2010, on an occasion separate and distinct from Counts 4, 5, and 6, the defendant had sexual contact with J.R.O.;
- (2) That J.R.O. was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual contact and was not married to the defendant;
 - (3) That J.R.O. was at least thirty-six months younger than the defendant; and
 - (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

To convict the defendant of the crime of Rape of a Child in the First Degree as charged in Count 2, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about or between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2010, on an occasion separate and distinct from Counts 4, 5, and 6, the defendant had sexual intercourse with J.R.O.;
- (2) That J.R.O. was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual intercourse and was not married to the defendant;
 - (3) That J.R.O. was at least twenty-four months younger than the defendant; and
 - (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

To convict the defendant of the crime of Rape of a Child in the First Degree as charged in Count 4, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about or between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2010, on an occasion separate and distinct from Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6, the defendant had sexual intercourse with J.R.O.;
- (2) That J.R.O. was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual intercourse and was not married to the defendant;
 - (3) That J.R.O. was at least twenty-four months younger than the defendant; and
 - (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

To convict the defendant of the crime of Rape of a Child in the First Degree, as charged in Count 5, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about or between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2010, on an occasion separate and distinct from Counts 2, 3, 4 and 6, the defendant had sexual intercourse with J.R.O.;
- (2) That J.R.O. was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual intercourse and was not married to the defendant;
- (3) That J.R.O. was at least twenty-four months younger than the defendant; and
 - (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

1

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 16_

To convict the defendant of the crime of Rape of a Child in the First Degree as charged in Count 6, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about or between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2010, on an occasion separate and distinct from Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, the defendant had sexual intercourse with J.R.O.;
- (2) That J.R.O. was less than twelve years old at the time of the sexual intercourse and was not married to the defendant;
 - (3) That J.R.O. was at least twenty-four months younger than the defendant; and
 - (4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

Exhibit F

DATE: /////8

17-1-00097-3

TIME: 4:48 Pm

Do not disclose any information or state how the jury has voted.

JURY QUESTION

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We have not come to a Concerse on 4 of the counts. How long must me deliberate?

FOREMAN/ PRESIDING HIPOP

Exhibit G

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NOV 02 2018 11:10

Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

Plaintiff,	NO. 17-1-00097-3
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	VERDICT FORM 1 – COUNT 1
We, the jury, find the above-named defer	ndant,
DATED this 1st day of NOVEMBER, 2018.	
PRESI	DING JUROR

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Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	VERDICT FORM 2 – COUNT 2	
We, the jury, find the above-named defendant, WRITE IN "NOT GUILTY" OR "GUILTY"		
of the crime of RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE as charged in Count 2.		
DATED this 2nd day of N	OVEMBER, 2018.	
PRESI	DING JUBOR	

NOV 02 2018 11:10
Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	VERDICT FORM 3 – COUNT 3	
We, the jury, find the above-named defendant, WRITE IN "NOT GUILTY" OR "GUILTY"		
of the crime of CHILD MOLESTATION IN THE FIRST DEGREE as charged in Count 3.		
DATED this 2 day of November, 2018.		
PRESIDING JUROR		

NOV 02 2016 //:/0 Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
Plaintiff,		
v. DARYL ROGERS,	VERDICT FORM 4 - COUNT 4	
Defendant.		
We, the jury, find the above-named defendant, WRITE IN "NOT GUILTY" OR "GUILTY"		
of the crime of RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE as charged in Count 4.		
DATED this 1th day of November, 2018.		
Wanled R. Hant PRESIDING JUROR		

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
Plaintiff,		
v.		
DARYL ROGERS,	VERDICT FORM 5 - COUNT 5	
Defendant.		
We, the jury, find the above-named defendant, WRITE IN "NOT GUILTY" OR "GUILTY" of the crime of RAPE OF A CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE as charged in Count 5.		
DATED this day of Noviember , 2018.		
PRESIDING JUROR		

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Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	No. 17-1-00097-3
Plaintiff,	
V.	VEDDIOT FORM C. COUNT 6
DARYL ROGERS,	VERDICT FORM 6 - COUNT 6
Defendant.	
We, the jury, find the above-named defe	ndant,
	WRITE IN "NOT GUILTY" OR GUILTY
of the crime of RAPE OF A CHILD IN TH	IE FIRST DEGREE as charged in Count 6.
DATED this day of	, 2018.
	IDINO ILIBOR
PRES	IDING JUROR

Exhibit H

FILED NOV 02 2018 \1:\0

Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 1 – COUNT 1
We, the jury, having found the defend	dant guilty of Child Molestation in the First
Degree as charged in Count 1, answer the	questions submitted by the court as follows:
QUESTION 1: Was the crime part o same victim under the age of 18 years man prolonged period of time?	f an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the ifested by multiple incidents over a
ANSWER 1: (Wr	ite "yes" or "no")
QUESTION 2: Did the defendant us the commission of the crime?	e a position of trust or confidence to facilitate
ANSWER 2: (Wri	ite "yes" or "no")
DATED this 1st day of Nov	<u>GMOSP</u> , 2018.
PRESIDI	NG JUROR

FILED

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Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 2 - COUNT 2
We, the jury, having found the defend	dant guilty of Rape of a Child in the First
Degree as charged in Count 2, answer the	questions submitted by the court as follows:
QUESTION 1: Was the crime part of same victim under the age of 18 years man prolonged period of time?	f an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the ifested by multiple incidents over a
ANSWER 1: Wri	te "yes" or "no")
QUESTION 2: Did the defendant use the commission of the crime?	e a position of trust or confidence to facilitate
ANSWER 2: Ves (Wri	te "yes" or "no")
DATED this 2nd day of Nove	ember, 2018.
PRESIDIN	NG JUROR HOW

NOV 02 2018 //: (i)
Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 3 – COUNT 3	
We, the jury, having found the defend	dant guilty of Child Molestation in the First	
Degree as charged in Count 3, answer the o	questions submitted by the court as follows:	
QUESTION 1: Was the crime part of same victim under the age of 18 years mani prolonged period of time?	an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the fested by multiple incidents over a	
ANSWER 1: (Write	te "yes" or "no")	
QUESTION 2: Did the defendant use a position of trust or confidence to facilitate the commission of the crime?		
ANSWER 2: Writ	e "yes" or "no")	
DATED this 2nd day of Nove	my R There	

NOV 02 2018 | 1.(O Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 4 – COUNT 4	
We, the jury, having found the defend	dant guilty of Rape of a Child in the First	
Degree as charged in Count 4, answer the	questions submitted by the court as follows:	
QUESTION 1: Was the crime part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim under the age of 18 years manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time?		
ANSWER 1: (Wri	te "yes" or "no")	
QUESTION 2: Did the defendant use the commission of the crime?	e a position of trust or confidence to facilitate	
ANSWER 2: (Wri	te "yes" or "no")	
DATED this 15t day of Nove	ember, 2018.	
ZULL PRESIDIN	JR H	

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
V.	SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 5 - COUNT 5	
DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.		
We, the jury, having found the defend	dant guilty of Rape of a Child in the First	
Degree as charged in Count 5, answer the	questions submitted by the court as follows:	
QUESTION 1: Was the crime part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim under the age of 18 years manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time?		
ANSWER 1: Wri	te "yes" or "no")	
QUESTION 2: Did the defendant use the commission of the crime?	e a position of trust or confidence to facilitate	
ANSWER 2: (Wri	ite "yes" or "no")	
DATED this 15+ day of Nove	mber , 2018.	
W	MR Hdi	
PRESIDI	NG JUROR	

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Scott G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,	No. 17-1-00097-3	
v. DARYL ROGERS, Defendant.	SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 6 - COUNT 6	
We, the jury, having found the defen	dant guilty of Rape of a Child in the First	
Degree as charged in Count 6, answer the	questions submitted by the court as follows:	
QUESTION 1: Was the crime part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim under the age of 18 years manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time?		
ANSWER 1: (Wr	ite "yes" or "no")	
QUESTION 2: Did the defendant use a position of trust or confidence to facilitate the commission of the crime?		
ANSWER 2: (Wr	ite "yes" or "no")	
DATED this day of	<u>smber</u> , 2018.	
PRESIDII	NG JUROR	

Exhibit I

1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON	
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK	
3		
4	STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	
5	Plaintiff,) No. 17-1-00097-3	
6	v.) COA No. 53221-2-II	
7	DARYL C. ROGERS, II,)	
8	Defendant.)	
9		
10	JURY TRIAL, VOLUME II	
11	The Honorable Robert Lewis Presiding	
12	October 29, 2018	
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21		
22		
23	Transcribed by: Reed Jackson Watkins, LLC	
24	Court-Approved Transcription	
25	206.624.3005	

1	API	PEARANCES
2		
3	On Behalf of Plaintiff:	COLIN P. HAYES
4		Clark County Prosecuting
5		Attorney's Office
6		P.O. Box 5000
7		Vancouver, Washington 98666-5000
8		
9	On Behalf of Defendant:	JEFFREY D. STAPLES
LO		Attorney at Law
L1		1014 Franklin Street
1.2		Vancouver, Washington 98660-3040
13		
L 4	Also Present:	DARYL C. ROGERS, II, Defendant
15		MONICA HERNANDEZ, VPD Detective
16		
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DIRECT BY HAYES/J. OGLETREE

- 1 give voice answers.
- 2 Go ahead.

3

- 4 DIRECT EXAMINATION
- 5 BY MR. HAYES:
- 6 Q. Jazmyne, how do you spell your first name?
- 7 A. J-A-Z-M-Y-N-E.
- 8 Q. And what's your middle name?
- 9 A. Renee (phonetic).
- 10 Q. How old are you, Jazmyne?
- 11 A. I'm 19 now.
- 12 Q. When is your birthday?
- 13 A. It's June 30th, 1999.
- 14 Q. And where -- what city are you living in right now?
- 15 A. Vancouver, Washington.
- 16 Q. Do you have any brothers or sisters?
- 17 A. I have a sister and two brothers.
- 18 Q. Tell me about that. What are their names and ages?
- 19 A. I have two brothers. One is a sophomore in high school now
- 20 at Skyview. His name is Xavier. And I have a little
- 21 brother who is a sixth grader. His name is James. And a
- 22 sister I don't really see, who is also a sophomore. Her
- 23 name is Tamara (phonetic).
- 24 Q. And do each of you have the same sets of parents?
- 25 A. Just our mom. Different dad for my sister.

1	CERTIF	ICATE
2		
3	STATE OF WASHINGTON)	
4)	SS
5	COUNTY OF KING)	
6		
7	I, the undersigned, o	do hereby certify under penalty
8	of perjury that the foregoing cou	art proceedings were transcribed
9	under my direction as a certified	transcriptionist; and that the
10	transcript is true and accurate t	to the best of my knowledge and
11	ability, including any changes ma	ade by the trial judge reviewing
12	the transcript; that I received t	the audio and/or video files in
13	the court format; that I am not a	a relative or employee of any
14	attorney or counsel employed by t	the parties hereto, nor
15	financially interested in its out	come.
16		
17		
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I	have hereunto set my hand
19	this 21st day of June, 2019.	
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21		
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23	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
24	Bonnie Reed, CET	
25		

Exhibit J

1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK
3	
4	STATE OF WASHINGTON,)
5	Plaintiff,) No. 17-1-00097-3
6	v.) COA No. 53221-2-II
7	DARYL C. ROGERS, II,
8	Defendant.)
9	
10	JURY TRIAL - VOLUME III
11	The Honorable Robert Lewis Presiding
12	October 30, 2018
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21	
22	Transcribed by: Elizabeth R. Blackburn, CCR
23	Reed Jackson Watkins
24	Court-Certified Transcription
25	206.624.3005

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13	Also Present:	DARYL C. ROGERS, II, Defendant
14		
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CROSS BY STAPLES/OGLETREE

1 A. Not all the time. Just once or twice I can remember

- 2 actually seeing it.
- 3 Q. Okay. Now, you said that what prompted you guys to come
- 4 back from Alaska was, at least in part, that this man was
- 5 your stepdad, seemed to have located you?
- 6 A. Yes, sir.
- 7 Q. You think that Daryl may have been the one who told your
- 8 -- told your stepdad where you were; is that correct?
- 9 A. I think -- well, I know that my mom told me and said
- that, that can be a possibility because they were
- 11 friends.
- 12 Q. They were really close, right?
- 13 A. James and Daryl, yes.
- 14 O. Yeah. In fact, James named Daryl the godfather of your
- 15 youngest brother?
- 16 A. Yeah.
- 17 Q. Okay. So you've indicated previously that you're unsure,
- foggy about the timeline that when you moved in with
- 19 Daryl; is that correct?
- 20 A. Yeah, I don't know when.
- 21 Q. In fact, you said before it could be fourth, fifth or
- 22 sixth grade?
- 23 A. Around then, yeah.
- 24 Q. Okay. In terms of the timeline for how long you believed
- 25 you lived with Daryl, when you were initially recalling

CROSS BY STAPLES/OGLETREE

- it to the police, you said you thought it was for a year;
- 2 is that right?
- 3 MR. HAYES: Objection. Hearsay. It's not impeachment
- 4 at this point.
- 5 THE COURT: Overruled. Repeat the question.
- 6 Q. (By Mr. Staples) The question was: Do you recall
- 7 initially saying that it was for up to a year?
- 8 A. I did.
- 9 Q. Okay. Was that how long you believe it is now?
- 10 A. No.
- 11 Q. How long do you think you lived with them?
- 12 A. I don't know.
- 13 Q. Okay. Now, you stated on other occasions that you
- 14 thought that the sexual contact occurred frequently,
- like, maybe three or four times per week during the
- 16 course of that what you thought initially was a year?
- 17 A. Was true.
- 18 Q. You've testified you don't remember if there was more
- than one incident while you were living at the house with
- 20 Daryl in which he rubbed his penis on your thighs,
- 21 correct?
- 22 A. Can you repeat that?
- 23 Q. I'm sorry. My question was: You testified earlier you
- 24 don't know whether or not Daryl rubbed his penis on your
- 25 thighs more than one -- more than one time or if it was

REDIRECT BY HAYES/OGLETREE

- 1 very much.
- 2 Q. So you'd expressed at least that you didn't like Daryl?
- 3 A. That's what I told him a long time ago, yeah.
- 4 Q. Okay. Did you tell him that something had happened
- 5 between you and Daryl?
- 6 A. No, I just expressed that I didn't like him very much and
- 7 that he was weird.
- 8 Q. Defense asked you about a concussion, so you got that
- 9 during a basketball game?
- 10 A. Yes, sir.
- 11 Q. Did -- did the concussion in any way affect your ability
- to know what the defendant did to you?
- 13 A. No.
- 14 Q. That time that you told us about yesterday, the very
- 15 first memory you have of something happening in the
- 16 Fisher Mill Apartments, did the defendant have a friend
- over while that was happening?
- 18 A. I don't remember.
- 19 Q. Was there -- were there any -- were there any other
- 20 people in the room with you when that was happening?
- 21 A. No.
- 22 Q. So in regards to how long you think you may -- you and
- 23 your family might have lived with Daryl in the house, did
- 24 it feel like it was a long time?
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 THE COURT: Hi. Welcome back. I hope you had a good
- 2 lunch and you're ready to continue with the examination
- 3 of this witness.
- 4 Q. (By Mr. Hayes) So when we left off, I think I was asking
- 5 you about talks you were having on the phone with the
- 6 defendant about moving back in with his family in
- 7 Vancouver. So after you -- that idea came up in
- 8 conversation with the defendant, did you talk to his
- 9 mother before finalizing those plans?
- 10 A. No.
- 11 Q. Who did you talk to, to finalize the plans to actually
- move in with them?
- 13 A. Just him.
- 14 Q. Just the defendant. And how long did you and your kids
- 15 stay that the house with the defendant and members of his
- 16 family?
- 17 A. Just a few months.
- 18 Q. Do you have any idea how many?
- 19 A. We got there either March --
- 20 Q. March of what year?
- 21 A. 2010.
- 22 Q. Okay. So you say the end of March? Is that what you
- 23 said?
- 24 A. It -- it was -- it was the 10th of either March or April.
- 25 Q. Okay. 10th of either March or April, 2010. And do you

- 1 remember anything --
- 2 A. We left before fall.
- 3 Q. Before fall? Was it still summer when you left?
- 4 A. I believe so.
- 5 Q. Did -- do you recall having a birthday for any of your
- 6 children while you were still there in that house in
- 7 2010?
- 8 A. Xavier and Jazmyne's birthdays were both May and June. I
- 9 don't remember having any money to throw a party for
- 10 them, but their birthdays were during that time.
- 11 Q. Okay. And when you moved in, what was the understanding
- 12 regarding rent?
- 13 A. There was none.
- 14 Q. So did you guys discuss that at all, like the fact that
- there wouldn't be rent or there would be, or was it
- 16 discussed at all?
- 17 A. It wasn't discussed. I was getting food stamps at the
- 18 time, so I put food in the house. So I brought groceries
- 19 and -- and cooked.
- 20 Q. Okay. But when you moved in, there was no formal
- agreement about whether you would or wouldn't pay any
- 22 rent?
- 23 A. No.
- 24 Q. Before we talk more about the living situation there, do
- 25 you still recall the layout of the TV living room area in

- car, but I eventually ended up being okay.
- 2 Q. You said you went to stay with your mom?
- 3 A. Yeah.
- 4 Q. Did you previously have much of a relationship with your
- 5 mom?
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. So was there any kind of argument or anything while you
- 8 were trying to get your things and leave?
- 9 A. We went back to the house a couple days after we left.
- 10 Me and Jaz went to get some of our stuff. And when we
- 11 were in the house, Daryl and Dee was in the house. We
- had some words, and I remember both of them standing over
- the top of me with Daryl right here and Dee right here.
- 14 Q. And was there an argument about them wanting the keys
- 15 back?
- 16 A. And I told them they'd get their key when I got my stuff.
- 17 Q. So that was -- so was there some kind of disagreement
- 18 about the timing of when you would give the key in
- 19 relation to when you were able to get your stuff?
- 20 A. Uh-huh.
- 21 Q. You have to answer yes or no.
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. And did either you or the defendant call the police at
- 24 that point?
- 25 A. Originally I thought he did, but then I remembered I

- 1 called the police because I was -- Jaz was standing in
- the corner scared because one of them was blocking the
- 3 door and wouldn't let us leave.
- 4 Q. With the key?
- 5 A. With the key.
- 6 Q. Okay. So you --
- 7 A. And they were -- they were saying, "Well, you're not
- going anywhere." And -- and matter fact, he made Dee
- 9 stand in front of the door.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. So that's when I called the police because they wouldn't
- 12 let us leave.
- 13 Q. And after the police got there, did the police stick
- 14 around while you got your stuff and then ultimately left
- 15 the key?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. And then have you seen the defendant -- have you talked
- 18 with defendant since that day?
- 19 A. Negative.
- 20 Q. So you said you left, and you came back to get some
- 21 things?
- 22 A. Uh-huh.
- 23 Q. You have to answer --
- 24 A. Yes. Sorry.
- 25 Q. It's all right. Have you seen the defendant since that

CROSS BY STAPLES/POINDEXTER

- 1 Q. And then you moved out, I believe your testimony was,
- 2 within a week or two later?
- 3 A. Correct.
- 4 Q. And then you came back sometime after that within -- I
- 5 think you said a matter of days or weeks to retrieve some
- 6 belongings?
- 7 A. Correct.
- 8 Q. That's when you had this argument that escalated to the
- 9 point where the police were called?
- 10 A. Correct.
- 11 Q. And you testified that Jazmyne was present for that
- 12 argument?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. All right. Now, the discussion -- the disclosure that
- the Jazmyne made to you that you testified to about
- earlier, that was in the context of a discussion that she
- and you were having about her behavior, correct?
- 18 A. Correct.
- 19 Q. You weren't happy with some of her behavior?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 Q. And you were telling her that if she -- she kept it up,
- 22 that she was going the get raped?
- 23 A. Correct.
- Q. During the course of this discussion, the context of it
- is that you -- not for the first time, but you had just

CROSS BY STAPLES/POINDEXTER

- 1 A. Yeah.
- 2 Q. Okay. So she was fine -- your testimony today is that
- 3 she was fine with it?
- 4 A. She did. Yep.
- 5 Q. She did what?
- 6 A. She wanted to go to Alaska to go stay with my sister.
- 7 Q. Okay. And the reason you answered it differently when I
- 8 interviewed in May is you misunderstood the question?
- 9 A. Maybe, yeah.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. To get her away from him was part of it. But to get her
- 12 to change her whole behavior pattern --
- 13 THE COURT: Answered the question --
- 14 THE WITNESS: Was --
- 15 THE COURT: -- so now you need to wait for the next
- 16 question.
- 17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
- 18 Q. (By Mr. Staples) You testified that the issue Jaz harming
- 19 herself, you didn't know anything about that until after
- 20 she'd already made these disclosures to you; is that
- 21 correct?
- 22 A. Correct.
- 23 Q. Okay. So and you testified about the arrangements
- 24 that -- part of your motivation in getting this night job
- 25 was so that you didn't have to pay for childcare during

CROSS BY STAPLES/POINDEXTER

- 1 the day?
- 2 A. And I didn't have to worry about anybody else watching my
- 3 kids during the daytime.
- 4 Q. Right.
- 5 A. I could watch them during the daytime.
- 6 Q. Right. And you testified that school -- on school
- 7 nights, bedtime's nine -- or you said before school time
- 8 or during school week bedtime for them was 9:00, and so
- 9 they'd already be in bed by the time you left for work?
- 10 A. Correct.
- 11 Q. Okay. Including Jazmyne?
- 12 A. Correct.
- 13 Q. Now, I was a little confused about your -- your testimony
- 14 about Daryl because the kids were in bed, so when you
- 15 were working, you didn't have any specific
- 16 responsibilities that related to the kids, other than,
- 17 say, not -- make sure the house didn't burn down?
- 18 A. Correct.
- 19 Q. And of Daryl's sister, Shatyra, is it accurate to say
- 20 that she didn't do anything? She would just lay around
- 21 the house all day? Is that accurate?
- 22 A. Correct.
- 23 Q. So she was around a lot?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 Q. Do you recall whether or not Daryl's parents, even though

CERTIFICATE

STATE OF WASHINGTON)

, ss

COUNTY OF KING)


I, the undersigned, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing recorded court proceedings were transcribed under my direction as a court reporter, and that the transcript is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and ability, including any changes made by the trial judge reviewing the transcript, that I received the audio and/or video files in the court format, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially interested in its outcome.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 13th day of June, 2019.

Elizabeth R. Blackburn

Certified Court Reporter, No. 3414

State of Washington



FILED Court of Appeals

1	THE SUPE		nders of Washington
2	II	State of Was N AND F 6/17/2019 기	
3			,
4	STATE OF WASHINGTON	N,)	
5	P	laintiff,)	COA No. 53221-2-II
6	vs.)	Cause No. 17-1-00097-3
7	DARYL C. ROGERS, I	I,	
8	De	efendant.)	
9			
10		JURY TRIAL - VO	LUME IV
11	The l	Honorable Robert L	ewis Presiding
12		October 31,	2018
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24	Transcribed by:	Reed Jackson Wat	
25		Court Certified 206.624.3005	Transcription

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CROSS BY STAPLES/HERNANDEZ

- 1 Q. And you indicated -- is it correct that you indicated that
- 2 he said that he babysat them at least in the evenings on one
- 3 or two occasions?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. Did he also, in response to your question about that,
- 6 indicate that when he did so that he would always have a
- 7 friend with him?
- 8 A. He did indicate that, yes.
- 9 Q. Regarding the length of time in which Amanda lived with him
- 10 after she moved back from Alaska, did you ask Defendant
- 11 about what length of time she lived with him?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. And what did he indicate about that length of time?
- 14 A. A couple months.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. Or three months. I don't know. I read it from the
- 17 transcript a few minutes ago.
- 18 Q. Okay. In the context of that question, were you asking
- 19 him -- telling him that -- that it was a year and he was
- 20 saying that it was only a couple months?
- 21 A. I don't remember. I'd have to look.
- 22 Q. You can refer to page 47 of your interview, Bates stamped
- No. 269 -- or excuse me, 296. I'm looking at the top
- several lines of the page, specifically his response on two
- 25 lines, 281 to 282.

CROSS BY STAPLES/PHELPS

- 1 conversation for -- that he said that he maybe one or two
- 2 times watched the -- them when the parents went out?
- 3 A. Yeah, I believe so.
- 4 O. Would it also be consistent with your memory of that account
- 5 that he indicated that he only watched the kids with
- 6 somebody else and not alone?
- 7 A. I can't recall if he said that or not.
- 8 Q. Okay. Would it be helpful to you if you could refer to a
- 9 transcript for this conversation?
- 10 A. Sure. Yeah. Excuse me. Thank you.
- 11 Q. If I could refer you to page 12 of that transcript,
- 12 specifically his response at line 527.
- 13 A. Okay. Yeah, he did say that, that he would have a friend
- 14 with him when he would babysit.
- 15 Q. And you indicated in terms of the length of time that Daryl
- indicated to you that Amanda lived when she got back from
- 17 Alaska, that that was a matter of a few months?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. He said two or three months maybe but not longer than that?
- 20 A. I believe his estimate was three or four months but
- 21 definitely less than six months.
- 22 Q. If I could refer you to page 47 of that transcript,
- 23 specifically lines 2098 to 2100.
- 24 A. Yeah, at that point in our conversation he did say two to
- 25 three months. There was another portion where he said three

CROSS BY STAPLES/PHELPS

- to four months or definitely less than six months, so it was
- 2 a lengthy conversation. There was times when he would talk
- 3 about something and then seemed to recollect better and --
- 4 and not change his statement but slightly modify it to -- to
- 5 comport with his memory.
- 6 Q. He was trying to estimate --
- 7 A. That's correct.
- 8 Q. -- this conversation you guys had with him in 2016, in
- 9 March 2016, asking him about something at that point that
- 10 was about six years prior?
- 11 A. That's correct.
- 12 Q. So if you refer to -- at one point in the conversation did
- 13 he say it was probably -- may have been less than two
- 14 months?
- 15 A. He may have.
- 16 Q. And if I could refer you to page 6, line 251.
- 17 A. Okay. Yeah, at that point in the conversation he said it
- 18 was less than two months.
- 19 Q. Yeah. And then on page 4 at line 273, 274 that -- actually
- 20 273 to 280, you have a little bit of a discussion about
- 21 whether it was two or three months; is that right?
- 22 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 23 Q. Okay. And maybe you're able to direct me to it. I'm not
- 24 seeing any portion in my review that indicates him saying it
- 25 could be as long as four months. Am I missing something?

DIRECT BY STAPLES/SHATYRA ROGERS

- 1 A. With Amanda it was James, Xavier, and Dougie -- James,
- 2 little James.
- 3 Q. Do you remember the approximate ages of the kids when they
- 4 moved in?
- 5 A. I couldn't say exactly.
- 6 Q. Were they school age?
- 7 A. Yes. I think the youngest one -- I don't think the youngest
- 8 one was in school. I think the oldest two, however, was in
- 9 school.
- 10 Q. Okay. How long did Amanda and her children stay there?
- 11 A. I would say no more than two months.
- 12 Q. Okay. Not 100 percent sure about --
- 13 A. Not 100 percent sure of the exact time they left, but it was
- 14 definitely for a short period of time.
- 15 Q. All right. So while they were living there, what were the
- 16 sleeping arrangements for everybody in the house?
- 17 A. I slept out in the living room on the couch facing the TV;
- 18 Amanda slept in the -- which was technically a formal dining
- 19 room, but we had it set up in a kind of sitting -- another
- 20 living-room style; she slept in that room. And then there
- 21 were bedrooms down the hallway.
- 22 If you walked down the hallway, the kids were in the
- 23 bedroom to the left, which was across from the bathroom.
- 24 And then if you continue down the hallway, Daryl was in the
- 25 master bedroom to the right and Dmechi (phonetic) and Davion

CROSS BY HAYES/SHATYRA ROGERS

- 1 A. Not specifically.
- 2 O. And you think that Amanda and her kids came to stay with you
- 3 all for about two to three months?
- 4 A. Yes. Well, probably two, but, yes.
- 5 Q. Where did Amanda sleep in the house?
- 6 A. On the couch in the family room.
- 7 Q. So in the mornings, what time did you have to get to Lowe's
- 8 on days you were working?
- 9 A. 7:00.
- 10 Q. What time did you leave the work -- what time would you
- leave the house by in the mornings?
- 12 A. Usually by 6:15 or 6:30.
- 13 Q. And what time would you get home afterward normally?
- 14 A. Usually 4:30 -- anywhere between 4:30 and 5 o'clock,
- 15 obviously depending on traffic.
- 16 Q. And you were working five days a week?
- 17 A. Yes, usually.
- 18 Q. So typically a full-time work schedule?
- 19 A. Typically.
- 20 Q. And you weren't limited to just a Monday through Friday. It
- 21 could have been any five days of the week?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. And during the time that Amanda and her family were there,
- 24 did you ever leave the house for any social -- socially to
- 25 see friends, anything like that?

- James's children?
- 2 A. On occasion, once or twice. No more than -- no more than
- 3 that.
- 4 Q. Okay. Did you -- do you recall or do you know whether or
- 5 not Daryl ever babysat for the kids?
- 6 A. I can't say for sure. Maybe once or twice, but I couldn't
- 7 tell you with 100 percent certainty if he ever did.
- 8 Q. Do -- or did you live -- ever end up living in the same
- 9 house with Amanda and James ?
- 10 A. Yes, we did.
- 11 Q. So when that came to be, were you still living at that house
- that you gave us the address for earlier?
- 13 A. We were.
- 14 Q. At the time that Amanda and James came to live with you,
- who was living in that house before they got there with you?
- 16 A. It was myself, Montrel, my brother, and my sister.
- 17 Q. And who -- was it just James and Amanda moved in with you
- 18 guys, or were there more people?
- 19 A. It was both the two boys as well.
- 20 Q. Okay. So not James but Amanda and all three of the kids?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. So once -- or when -- or do you recall when Amanda and her
- 23 kids moved in?
- 24 A. I can't say the exact date for sure, but I do recall that it
- 25 was after my birthday in 2010, and my birthday is at the end

- of March, so I would say apparently April's time frame.
- 2 Q. Okay. That's an estimate, though. It's a long time ago so
- 3 you can't be sure?
- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 Q. So once Amanda and James moved in, can you tell me what
- 6 the sleeping arrangements were in the house?
- 7 A. So my sister stayed in the living room, but I was closest to
- 8 the back door. She slept on the couch; I was facing the TV.
- 9 Amanda stayed in the family room right at the front door. I
- 10 believe the kids stayed in the first --- so there's a hallway
- in the house. They stayed in the first room on the left.
- 12 Myself and Montrel stayed on the last room on the left, and
- my brother stayed in the last room on the right.
- 14 Q. Okay. So how many bedrooms are in the house in total?
- 15 A. Three bedrooms.
- 16 Q. Okay. How long -- sorry. Actually, I'm going to --
- 17 MR. STAPLES: May I approach the witness?
- 18 THE COURT: Yes, you may.
- 19 Q. (By Mr. Staples) I'm showing you what's been admitted for
- 20 illustrative purposes as Exhibit No. 13. Have you ever seen
- 21 this before, the drawing I mean?
- 22 A. I have not seen this drawing personally, but it looks
- 23 very --
- 24 Q. Did I ever tell you I was going to show you a drawing?
- 25 A. No.

- 1 Q. Okay. Do you have any idea what it's based on, what appears
- in front of you, as to what it's a drawing of?
- 3 A. 2104, at the house we lived at.
- 4 Q. Okay. Does the drawing appear to you to accurately reflect
- 5 the layout of the house at that time, or is there anything
- 6 that you would change about it?
- 7 A. The rooms look bigger but overall, yes, they're -- it's
- 8 fairly accurate.
- 9 Q. Okay. Problem with scale, maybe?
- 10 A. Yeah, definitely.
- 11 Q. Okay. In terms of the general positioning of the rooms and
- 12 their connectedness to each other, is that accurate?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. Okay. So how long did Amanda and her kids live there, as
- 15 best as you can recall?
- 16 A. Couldn't have been more than a couple months at most. I do
- 17 remember them being -- I can't say for sure when they left,
- 18 but I feel like it was before the summer started. Or I -- I
- 19 know the weather was nice, but it wasn't, like, mid-summer.
- 20 I believe I was still in school by the time they left.
- 21 Q. You don't think you'd finished the school year yet?
- 22 A. No.
- 23 Q. So let's talk about what you were doing during that time
- 24 frame. You were still in school, I assume, based on that
- 25 answer?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And how old were you, best estimate?
- 3 A. 16.
- 4 Q. What grade do you think that put you in?
- 5 A. So actually had just turned 17. That was -- I do remember
- it clearly; I was a junior in high school.
- 7 Q. Okay. What high school did you attend?
- 8 A. I went to Evergreen High School.
- 9 Q. Did you also do the Running Start program?
- 10 A. I did.
- 11 Q. So what did your school schedule look like in terms of the
- hours during the week you attend school?
- 13 A. So because I was doing full time when they start, I spent a
- 14 majority of my time at Clark College. So I would have two
- 15 classes in the morning every day, one at 8:00 -- one at 08,
- another at 09. And then on Tuesdays and Thursdays, I would
- have another class in the afternoon around 1300, 1:00 p.m.
- 18 MR. STAPLES: Sorry, Judge. Can we interrupt for a
- 19 second? I'm having a hard time hearing him.
- 20 THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you hang on just a second. Go
- 21 ahead and repeat your answer.
- 22 A. So every morning I had two classes, one at 08, another at
- 23 09. And on Tuesdays and Thursdays, I would have another
- 24 class around 1300. And then I was also in band, so I would
- 25 have practice, go back to the high school for band class,

- 1 usually in the afternoon.
- 2 Q. (By Mr. Staples) So this wasn't, like, a -- because you
- 3 were doing the Running Start, it doesn't sound like it's a
- 4 typical high school schedule where you show up at 8:00 and
- 5 leave at 3:30.
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 Q. So when you're not at one of your classes -- and you
- 8 mentioned being in band as well?
- 9 A. Yes, I was.
- 10 Q. So if you're not in one of your classes or at band during
- 11 the day, where would you go?
- 12 A. During the day, because most of my friends were still at the
- high school, I was just usually spending time at home.
- 14 Q. Okay. I don't know if you said what time band practice was
- and how often and when it would last until?
- 16 A. So at this time it was parade season, so band practice, we
- 17 would practice about two to three times a week for about an
- hour or two at most for the rehearsals.
- 19 Q. Okay. And what time of the day would that be?
- 20 A. The rehearsals were always in the evening after -- after
- 21 school, so that year I believe we were starting rehearsals
- 22 around 4:00, 5:00 p.m.
- 23 Q. So what was your social life like back then? Did you have
- 24 friends that you hung out with? Did you have other
- 25 extracurriculars?

DIRECT BY STAPLES/DOUGLAS

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Do you know someone named James C.
- 3 A. Yes, sir, I do.
- 4 Q. Can you tell me how you know those two people?
- 5 A. I briefly lived in the house with them when I was about 19
- 6 years old for a month and a half or two.
- 7 Q. Do you recall whether that was the first time you met them
- 8 is when they (inaudible)?
- 9 A. I met them previously at the Fisher Mills [sic], like one --
- 10 one time, maybe twice, but it was a small interaction, so I
- 11 really don't have too extensive history with them prior to
- 12 that.
- 13 Q. Okay. Do you remember approximately -- well, let me back up
- for a second. The house that you lived with them in, I
- think you said you lived with them for a period of time?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. So what house is that?
- 18 A. 2104 off of 98th and Burton.
- 19 Q. And before they came to live with you, who lived in the
- 20 house besides yourself?
- 21 A. Me, Daryl, Shatyra, and Demetrius.
- 22 Q. Okay. So when you say those people's names, can you give me
- 23 their full names?
- 24 A. Oh, Daryl Rogers, Demetrius Rogers, Shatyra Rogers.
- 25 Q. Okay. What period of time did you live in that house?

DIRECT BY STAPLES/DOUGLAS

- 1 A. 2009 to probably -- like, mid-2009 to probably, like, the
- 2 end of 2010.
- 3 Q. All right. Now, do you remember when Amanda and J
- 4 came to live with you?
- 5 A. I recall it was roughly around, like, the middle or end to
- 6 March to about the beginning of May. She wasn't there for
- 7 too long, about six weeks to two months.
- 8 O. Was that in 2010?
- 9 A. Yes, sir.
- 10 Q. Okay. Now, when James and Amanda moved in, was that the
- 11 makeup of the house as you described it? Everyone who you
- 12 said earlier already lived there?
- 13 A. Yes, sir.
- 14 O. Was it just Amanda and James a moved in or were there other
- 15 people that moved in with them?
- 16 A. Yes, it was James, Amanda, and also her two additional
- 17 children, James and Xavier.
- 18 Q. Do you recall approximately the ages of the children,
- 19 James, and Xavier?
- 20 A. James was probably, like, 10 or 11. James was probably,
- 21 like, 4. I know he wasn't going to school. And Xavier was
- 22 probably 6 or 7.
- 23 Q. And you stated -- I think you may have said already that you
- 24 were 19 at this time?
- 25 A. Yes, sir.

DIRECT BY STAPLES/DOUGLAS

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. -- have day care for him or anything?
- 3 A. No, he was home with Amanda.
- 4 Q. You estimated, I believe, earlier that -- one and a half to
- 5 two months in terms of the time frame that she lived there;
- 6 is that accurate?
- 7 A. Yes, sir.
- 8 Q. And it's fair to say this far removed from the event it's an
- 9 estimate on your part?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. What, if anything, do you remember about the circumstances
- 12 of Amanda moving out?
- 13 A. I know that when she moved out it was kind of a messy
- 14 situation. She got upset -- I mean, she called the cops,
- 15 you know, yelling.
- 16 Q. Were you present for this?
- 17 A. Yes, I was.
- 18 Q. I'm not going to ask you to tell me what anyone said
- 19 specifically (inaudible), but I'm wondering if you can tell
- 20 me what the topic or what the subject of the argument was.
- 21 A. It was revolving around rent, I believe. Like, she wasn't
- 22 paying rent or she owed some back money to Daryl's mom. And
- I guess when it was time to kind of, you know, pay the rent
- somehow, you know, people were on disagreements in regards
- 25 to that and she went -- you know, so really didn't have all

REDIRECT BY STAPLES/DOUGLAS

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Was this a short period of time?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Was it a long time ago?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. Okay. The stuff that you're testifying to today, is it
- 7 stuff that you remember?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. The mini fridge that was in Daryl's room, did that have food
- 10 and ice cream and stuff in it, or does -- or what would it
- 11 have in it?
- 12 A. It was all water. Daryl doesn't eat ice cream and stuff.
- He's just -- it was a lot of water.
- 14 Q. Does Daryl have a reputation for that?
- 15 A. What, drinking a lot of water?
- 16 Q. Mm-hmm.
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. So the access to the water, I mean, was this something that
- 19 Daryl hoarded for himself or were other people in the house
- 20 free to gather -- get water from there?
- 21 A. It's kind of his, like, personal water. It was like, you
- 22 know, got his water in his mini fridge, you know what I
- 23 mean?
- 24 Q. Yeah. You're -- are you still close friends with Daryl?
- 25 A. Oh, yes.

- 1 Q. Do you see him as much as you did back then when you were
- 2 living together?
- 3 A. No, I don't.
- 4 Q. Okay.
- 5 MR. STAPLES: All right. No further questions.
- 6 THE COURT: Recross.
- 7 MR. HAYES: Nothing.
- 8 THE COURT: Can the witness be excused, then?
- 9 MR. STAPLES: Yes, he can.
- THE COURT: All right. You're free to go. Don't discuss
- 11 your testimony with other potential witnesses.
- 12 Your next witness?
- MR. STAPLES: Your Honor, I think we'll have to have a
- 14 conference outside the presence of the jury.
- THE COURT: All right. We're going to take a brief break,
- 16 then. And close your notepads; leave them there in your
- 17 chairs. And don't discuss the case among yourselves or with
- 18 anyone else.
- 19 (Jury absent)
- 20 THE COURT: So you need to have a conference with me or
- 21 your client?
- MR. STAPLES: Well, I'll step back, with the Court's
- permission, if we can have five minutes together just to
- 24 make sure we have a chance to talk now about his decision to
- 25 testify. And then assuming he chooses to testify or not

DIRECT BY STAPLES/DARYL ROGERS

- 1 calling.
- 2 Q. Was the last thing you said cold call?
- 3 A. Cold calling, yeah. Cold call, that wasn't his name; that's
- 4 what me and Montrel left to do.
- 5 Q. Okay. You mean call people for the internship?
- 6 A. Yes. Well, we called it cold call- -- that's what the
- 7 internship called it, cold calling, but you would
- 8 essentially go and knock on people's doors.
- 9 Q. Oh, okay.
- 10 A. Yeah.
- 11 Q. During the time that Amanda and her children lived at the
- house with you, was there ever any occasion in which you
- were alone in the house with Jersey?
- 14 A. Never.
- 15 Q. Was there ever any occasion in which you were alone in a
- 16 room with January?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. How long do you recall -- or if you recall -- did Amanda and
- 19 her children live at the house with you?
- 20 A. I do not have exact dates because it's been quite a while,
- 21 but I usually try to navigate things from my past based on,
- 22 like, important dates. So my brother's birthday was
- 23 ; I know that they were not there for my brother's
- 24 birthday. And I got into a car accident on June 8th of that
- year, and she -- that was a few days after she left the

DIRECT BY STAPLES/DARYL ROGERS

- 1 house.
- 2 Q. Okay. So sometime between March 23rd and June 8th?
- 3 A. Yes, sir.
- 4 Q. But not necessarily that whole time?
- 5 A. Say that again.
- 6 Q. I said, but not necessarily that whole time?
- 7 A. That she was there? No. Not -- I'm not sure. I know for a
- 8 fact she wasn't there on -- before my brother's birthday or
- 9 on my brother's birthday. I know that she left a few days
- 10 before my car accident.
- 11 Q. Okay. What, if anything, do you remember about the
- 12 circumstances of her leaving?
- 13 A. It was tumultuous at best.
- 14 Q. All right. What -- was there a dispute?
- 15 A. Yes, sir.
- 16 Q. Can you tell me what the -- what caused the dispute without
- 17 telling me what anyone said specifically?
- 18 A. The dispute, it started over -- it started over the rent.
- 19 She -- her -- my mother asked her for the rent; they didn't
- 20 agree on it. At the time I was not -- she -- she then gave
- 21 me a call because I was out and about. She was venting to
- 22 me. I stopped her from venting because I felt like she was
- 23 disrespecting my mother. She hung up on me. When I got
- 24 home, she was no longer there.
- 25 She came back about a week and a half or two weeks

DIRECT BY STAPLES/DARYL ROGERS

- later, and when she started removing her stuff, I asked for
- 2 the key back before she left. She -- it became an issue
- 3 about her giving the key back before she left. She called
- the police; the police showed up, separated us, got each
- 5 person's story. Stayed there for her to get her stuff, made
- 6 sure I got the key back, and went about their way.
- 7 O. So some clarification questions here for you. You said that
- your recollection is that they left a few days before you
- 9 were in this car accident, which I believe you said was
- 10 June 8th?
- 11 A. Yes, sir.
- 12 Q. Now, when you say they left, is that them coming back for
- the stuff, or is that the -- when they were no longer there?
- 14 A. So them coming back for the stuff, so the day the police was
- 15 called, a few days later I got into a car accident.
- 16 Q. Okay. So based on what you said, is it true, then, that
- there's actually -- you said a week or two before that where
- they weren't actually living there?
- 19 A. Yes, sir.
- 20 Q. Okay. Now, who do you remember being present during this
- 21 argument you had at the house where they come back for the
- 22 stuff and the police are called?
- 23 A. So my sister was there when it started, but she was on her
- 24 way to work. Me and Montrel were there. We were actually
- trying to get prepared to leave the house to go to do some

1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF WASHINGTON)
4) ss
5	COUNTY OF KING)
6	
7	I, the undersigned, do hereby certify under penalty of
8	perjury that the foregoing court proceedings were transcribed
9	under my direction as a certified transcriptionist; and that the
10	transcript is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and
11	ability, including any changes made by the trial judge reviewing
12	the transcript; that I received the audio and/or video files in
13	the court format; that I am not a relative or employee of any
14	attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor
15	financially interested in its outcome.
16	
17	
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
19	this 14th day of June, 2019.
20	
21	
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23	
24	Bonnie Reed, CET
25	

Exhibit L

1	THE SUE	PERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
2		IN AND FOR THE	COUNTY OF CLARK
3			
4	STATE OF WASHINGT	ON,)
5		Plaintiff,) COA No. 53221-2-II
6	Vs.) Cause No. 17-1-00097-3
7	DARYL C. ROGERS,	II,)
8		Defendant.)
9			
10		JURY TRIAL	- VOLUME V
11	Th∈	Honorable Robe	rt Lewis Presiding
12		November	1, 2018
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24 25	Transcribed by:		Watkins, LLC ied Transcription

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CLOSING ARGUMENT - STAPLES

person, Lakendra, and it's a conflicting story about when the disclosure happened.

Another key set of points I want to make, as we all know, Jazmyne didn't make the allegations for years. Now, the prosecutor is going to tell you this is completely expected. This -- as Maureen Garrett said, this is a common phenomenon with these kinds of cases, but just because it's common doesn't have to mean that we don't consider the implications of that when we are evaluating whether or not the prosecutor has met their burden.

So because she hadn't made these allegations for years, we have to ask why, and one of the reasons it was reported was, well, she didn't want to make her family homeless. Well, I purport to you that that doesn't make a lot of sense. For one thing, the initial allegation — or the allegation back from Fisher Mill Apartments, that (inaudible) for a totally unrelated reason, not her mom's (inaudible) to get away from the abusive stepfather, and she didn't say anything. She obviously didn't say anything because Amanda brings her back to live in the house with Daryl years later.

So when she lives in the house with them, they're only there for a very short period of time. They leave after that short period of time for unrelated reasons, and she still says nothing. So testimony about when they leave is -- and this is basically the late spring, like, May or

CLOSING ARGUMENT - STAPLES

June of 2010, and this gets reported to police beginning of 2016. So we're talking almost six years in which she had nothing to do with Daryl.

So what's the motivation? Why this idea that, oh, we're going to make us homeless, but we're already homeless. They already got kicked -- or left this house, and we're homeless because of this dispute related to Daryl. As I said,

Jazmyne's counsel testified that delayed reporting is common. What that does not equal is that every delayed report is true. Just because delayed reporting is something that victims of childhood sexual trauma do, that it is common, does not mean that every delayed report is true.

Those are not equivalencies.

The delayed reporting makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the truth of her claims. That's just true. No one's going to dispute that. The fact that this is six and now eight years ago and ten to twelve years ago makes this much more difficult, and the prosecutor's going to get up and say that's not his fault. I guess that's true, but it doesn't matter.

You're not being asked to make excuses or to lower the bar because the case is difficult. And we're not blaming anybody for not bringing things up earlier. We're just saying, this is a fact that it is difficult to evaluate to determine the truth of an allegation when we're looking at

CLOSING ARGUMENT - STAPLES

something that happened 12 years ago as opposed to something
that happened more recently, and that's a fact that we have
to deal with.

One of the things that delayed -- that the delay causes is

that it can cause -- affect people's memories because it's a long time ago. And Jazmyne had significant memory problems. What are some of them? She can't remember lots of significant details. She can't remember how old she was when any of these things happened, called ranges of time, in some cases multiple years. She can't remember exactly what years they took place, what grades she was in.

How many certain types of things happened? She -- back at the Fisher Mill, she can't say how many times Daryl babysat, whether this was only one time or whether there were actually multiple times. In 2010, she can't say, was there more than one time in which there was penetration? Was there more than one time in which he allegedly came on her thigh? Was there more than one -- or how many times was there oral sex? Was Daryl circumcised? When asked about this, she said she didn't know, but she theorized possibly circumcised -- or possibly uncircumcised. We know that's not the case; Daryl is circumcised.

How long did she live with Daryl? She agreed that initially when she reported this she said that she -- this was over a year, and during that year, this happened four or

CLOSING ARGUMENT - STAPLES

1 fact that she told Kendra before, but, again, the disclosure 2 to Kendra is not well established because it's only coming 3 from her best friend who disagrees with the timing of it, 4 and Jazmyne's saying that there was an initial disclosure to 5 her years ago back in middle school and Kendra says that's 6 not the case. 7 Daryl has adamantly denied these allegations. He was 8 cooperative with the police. It's significant that he went 9 in for not just one, not just two, but three lengthy 10 interviews. I asked the detectives, "Did Daryl answer all your questions?" "Yes, answered all of our questions." 11 12 He was cooperative with the police, and the prosecutor, in 13 cross-examining Daryl, went through the transcripts of his 14 previous testimony looking for things (inaudible) spot 15 inconsistency, and I submit to you that exchange 16 demonstrated no inconsistency. 17 He's make- -- this is an interview he gave two years ago, 18 2016, when the allegations first serviced [sic] -- surfaced 19 about incidents between 8 and 12 years ago, and as we stand 20 here today -- or yesterday, rather, when he was on the 21 stand, there was nothing inconsistent about his testimony. 22 And the things that he testified to were corroborated by the 23 outside circumstances. 24 So the detectives, when they were questioning him, they 25

bring out to him that this happened over the course of a

CLOSING ARGUMENT - STAPLES

year, right? And they get that information simply from 1 Jazmyne, who said initially she thought it was a year. 2 Well, what does Daryl tell them? "Nope, that can't be the 3 case; it's only about two months, two to three months, two 4 to four months," as he initially says it. He's trying to 5 6 narrow down the timeline over time. He says, "No, definitely way shorter than that." 7 So there's already something that he was purporting 8 accurately all the way back then that initially they got 9 wrong. And all these exchanges about the idea that -- that 10 he was making up after the fact this idea that he was never 11 alone with her back at Fisher Mill, that he never babysat 12 the children alone. Well, he told the police that in these 13 interviews, and the prosecutor went to this passage which he 14 thought showed that he was talking about her in another 15 16 context. But I submit to you that reading that whole passage, it's very clear what he is saying. That they had 17 asked him -- he told them earlier that he was with -- that 18 he had somebody with him when he babysat. 19 They didn't ask him if it was -- who it was, and then they 20 asked him, "Did you babysit for anybody else?" He says, 21 "Yes, I babysat for -- oh, you know who it was, 22 actually -- " first he would come to Fisher Mill to her 23 24 house, "her" being Amanda. So this is the name that he 25 gives them, and he gives them their name, he tells them who

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3	STATE OF WASHINGTON)
4) ss
5	COUNTY OF KING)
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7	I, the undersigned, do hereby certify under penalty of
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L 4	attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor
15	financially interested in its outcome.
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L7	
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
L9	this 14th day of June, 2019.
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23	
24	Bonnie Reed, CET
	*

Exhibit M

1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK
3	
4	STATE OF WASHINGTON,)
5	Plaintiff,) No. 17-1-00097-3
6	vs.) COA No. 53221-2-II
7	DARYL C. ROGERS, II,)
8	Defendant.)
9	
10	JURY TRIAL, VOLUME VI
11	The Honorable Robert Lewis Presiding
12	November 2, 2018
13	
14	CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL HEARING
15	The Honorable Robert Lewis Presiding
16	December 21, 2018
17	
18	SENTENCING HEARING
19	The Honorable Robert Lewis Presiding
20	January 23, 2019
21	
22	TRANSCRIBED BY: Marcia Kladek, CET
23	Reed Jackson Watkins, LLC
24	Court-Approved Transcription
25	206.624.3005

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10		1014 Franklin Street
11		Vancouver, Washington 98660-3040
12		
13	Also Present:	DARYL C. ROGERS, II, Defendant
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19		EXHIBIT INDEX	
20	NO.	DESCRIPTION	ADMITTED
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22	2	Fingerprints and Booking Photo 2018	794
23	3-8	Certified Court Documents	791
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25			

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ability to turn this mic on as well?
1
          THE COURT: Andrea, is the -- can you unlock the camera and
2
        turn on the microphone for the witness stand?
          MR. HAYES: State calls Nancy Druckenmiller.
          THE COURT: Come forward.
          Do you swear or affirm that any testimony you give in this
        hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
        the truth, so help you?
8
          THE WITNESS: I do.
9
          THE COURT: Please be seated then.
10
          Now that you're seated, please state your name in full,
11
        then spell your last name for the court's records.
12
          THE WITNESS: Nancy Druckenmiller. My last name is spelled
13
        D-R-U-C-K-E-N-M-I-L-L-E-R.
14
          THE COURT: All right. Counsel?
15
16
                             Witness herein, having first been
    NANCY DRUCKENMILLER:
17
                             duly sworn on oath, was examined
18
                             and testified as follows:
19
20
21
                   DIRECT EXAMINATION
22
    BY MR. HAYES:
    Q. Ms. Druckenmiller, how are you currently employed?
23
    A. I work for the Clark County Sheriff's Office as
24
```

identification specialist.

- 1 Q. And what are your duties in that role?
- 2 A. To identify any persons whose identity is in question,
- 3 utilizing different programs. And part of that is providing
- 4 certified copies of booking photos and booking prints. I
- 5 have also been trained in how to compare fingerprints for the
- ten prints or the JMSs. And I also do photo lay-downs for
- 7 criminal justice as they request it.
- 8 MR. HAYES: Your Honor, State moves to admit
- 9 Identifications 3 through 8 as self-authenticating certified
- 10 court documents.
- THE COURT: 3 through 8, you said?
- 12 MR. HAYES: Correct.
- 13 THE COURT: Do you have any objections?
- 14 MR. STAPLES: Not as to their admissibility as
- 15 self-authenticating documents for purposes of sentencing.
- 16 THE COURT: 3 through 8 are admitted.
- 17 (Exhibits 3 through 8 admitted for sentencing hearing)
- 18 Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Ms. Druckenmiller, just briefly, what is your
- 19 training regarding fingerprint analysis?
- 20 A. In October 2006, I had a one-week training with Western
- 21 Identification Network, where they covered in learning what
- 22 fingerprints were, how to read the patterns, the ridges, what
- 23 type of ridges, and being able to compare the prints. We did
- 24 actual comparisons of -- or did comparisons of actual
- 25 fingerprints. And at the end, we had to take a test and be

- certified as we passed.
- 2 April of 2007, I took about a half-day class on how to roll
- fingerprints and the rolling of fingerprints. Again, we
- 4 covered the different parts of fingerprints, patterns and
- 5 types.
- And then, in May of 2007, I had a two-and-a-half day
- 7 training at Washington State Patrol to qualify for operating
- 8 the APIs computer, which is the automated fingerprint
- 9 identification system. In those two-and-a-half days, again,
- 10 we covered the different prints and learned how to be able to
- compare them against the prints in the computer. And then
- 12 I've had a couple other trainings with the APIs computer and
- when we upgraded to the APIs computer.
- 14 And I've taken a couple workshops and conferences in 2010
- and 2015 on fingerprints.
- 16 Q. How long have you been working in fingerprint analysis in the
- 17 Clark County Sheriff's Office?
- 18 A. I started in identification August of 2006.
- 19 Q. And, ballpark estimate, how many fingerprint comparison
- analysis cases have you worked on in that time?
- 21 A. I've kind of gone back through some of my past stat reports,
- 22 and I pretty much average about 250 a year or more. That's
- 23 not -- not including those that I compared in the APIs
- 24 computers.
- 25 Q. Are you familiar with the database the Clark County Sheriff's

DIRECT BY HAYES/DRUCKENMILLER

Office uses to store and maintain fingerprints taken in the

- 2 jail?
- 3 A. Yes, I am.
- 4 Q. How does Clark County Sheriff's Office maintain those rec- --
- 5 those fingerprint records?
- 6 A. That would be the Crossmatch Livespan computer. And
- fingerprints are taken on that computer, creating electronic
- 8 data for them. They are stored in that computer as such.
- 9 And from that computer, it's also transmitted -- those same
- 10 prints are transmitted to Washington State Patrol for
- 11 processing. And once they process them, approve and process
- 12 them, then the same prints also go up to the FBI for
- 13 processing.
- 14 Q. Fingerprints and booking photos, are they taken at the time
- of booking?
- 16 A. They should be, yes.
- 17 Q. And they are stored shortly thereafter in the computer --
- 18 A. As soon as the prints are taken on the computer, they are
- 19 stored in that computer.
- 20 Q. And does the sheriff's office take prints and booking photos
- in the regular course of business?
- 22 A. I'm sorry. What?
- 23 Q. Does the sheriff's office take booking prints and photos in
- the regular course of business?
- 25 A. Yes, it is. Yes, they do.

- 1 Q. I'm going to hand you Identification Number 2. Look through
- those documents. Let me know if you were the one who
- 3 certified them.
- 4 A. Yes. These are copies that I had certified, that I had
- 5 pulled from the two different computer systems.
- 6 Q. These are prints and a booking photo pertaining to a booking
- on December 30th, 2017; is that accurate?
- 8 A. That is correct.
- 9 Q. Pertaining to Daryl Rogers?
- 10 A. Daryl Craig Rogers, yes. And in this case, the prints were
- 11 taken on January 3rd.
- 12 Q. Okay. January 3rd.
- MR. HAYES: State moves to admit ID 2.
- 14 THE COURT: Any objection?
- 15 MR. STAPLES: No.
- 16 THE COURT: 2 is admitted.
- 17 (Exhibit 2 admitted for sentencing hearing)
- 18 Q. (By Mr. Hayes) I'm next going to hand you Identification
- 19 Number 1. Can you take a look at those and let me know if
- you were the one who certified those documents?
- 21 A. Yes. These are the copies I certified, pulling from the two
- 22 different systems.
- 23 Q. And these are fingerprints and a booking photo pertaining to
- 24 Daryl Craig Rogers from a booking that occurred on
- 25 November 2nd, 2018?

- 1 A. That is correct.
- 2 MR. HAYES: State moves to admit ID 1.
- 3 MR. STAPLES: No objection.
- 4 THE COURT: 1 is admitted.
- 5 (Exhibit 1 admitted for sentencing hearing)
- 6 Q. (By Mr. Hayes) So as part of this case, did you compare
- 7 those two sets of booking prints of Daryl Craig Rogers to two
- 8 different judgment and sentences?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. First one I'm going to hand up, pertaining to Case Number
- 11 05800471-7, is this one of the judgment and sentences you
- 12 reviewed?
- 13 A. Yes, it is.
- 14 Q. Would it be fair to say that, due to the poor quality of the
- prints, you were not able to make any comparison as to the
- prints on that judgment and sentence?
- 17 A. That is correct.
- 18 Q. I'm going to hand you up Identification Exhibit 6 pertaining
- 19 to 07800221-4. Were you able to make comparisons to the
- thumb prints on that judgment and sentence?
- 21 A. Yes, I was. I was able to compare prints of the left thumb
- 22 on the -- was it 2017 -- 2017 set of prints and the left
- thumb on the 2018 set of prints.
- 24 Q. And what were your conclusions regarding those?
- 25 A. I was able to determine that all three sets of prints were

1	CERTIFICATE					
2						
3	STATE OF WASHINGTON)					
4) ss					
5	COUNTY OF KING)					
6						
7	I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that the					
8	foregoing recorded statements, hearings and/or interviews were					
9	transcribed under my direction as a transcriptionist; and that					
10	the transcript is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge					
11	and ability; that I am not a relative or employee of any					
12	attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor					
13	financially interested in its outcome.					
14						
15	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this					
16	14th day of June, 2019.					
17						
18						
19						
20						
21	Marcia Kladek, CET					
22						
23						
24						
25						





Daryl Rogers <drogers5464@gmail.com>

Records Request :: W011010-082918

CRESA 9-1-1 <cresa@mycusthelp.net>
To: "drogers5464@gmail.com" <drogers5464@gmail.com>

Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 10:15 AM

--- Please respond above this line ---



09/12/2018

Daryl Rogers

RE: PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST of 8/29/2018, Reference # W011010-082918

Dear Daryl,

CRESA received a public records request from you on 8/29/2018 related to the incident(s) located at: 2104 NE 98th Avenue

Vancouver, WA 98664

CRESA has completed the necessary research and determined there are no records responsive to your request. Your request is now considered withdrawn.

If additional information becomes available that may allow CRESA to locate the records you are seeking, please re-submit a new request.

Sincerely,

CRESA Administrative Services

To monitor the progress or update this request please log into the CRESA PUBLIC RECORDS SYSTEM.



Daryl Rogers <drogers5464@gmail.com>

Records Request :: W011010-082918

CRESA 9-1-1 <cresa@mycusthelp.net>
To: "drogers5464@gmail.com" <drogers5464@gmail.com>

Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 10:19 AM

--- Please respond above this line ---



09/12/2018

Daryl Rogers

RE: PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST of 8/29/2018, Reference # W011010-082918


Dear Daryl,

CRESA received a public records request from you on 8/29/2018 related to the incident(s) located at: 2104 NE 98th Avenue

Vancouver, WA 98664

Please note that since the incident(s) occurred more than six (6) years ago, there are no available records. In accordance with Washington State records retention guidelines, CRESA retains 9-1-1 records for six years from the date of the incident, after this retention period, these records are permanently deleted.

Your request is now considered withdrawn and closed. [Quoted text hidden]





Jeff Steples rjeffstapleslaw@gmall.com>

Fwd: Records Request :: W009588-051718

i messec :

John Visser < john@investigativesolutions.us> To: Jeff Staples <jeffstapleslaw@gmail.com>

Mon, Nov 9, 2020 at 12:01 PM

Hi Jeff.

Here is the CRESA email based on a request for Daryl Rogers 2010 reports.

Kindest regards, Yvonne



JOHN D. VISSER

INVESTIGATIVE SOLUTIONS LLC 360.910.1190

9901 NE 7th Ave Suite B-235 VANCOUVER WA 98685

30 years of Investigative Experience

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Do not disseminate this email and destroy the original email and any copies.

Forwarded message -----

From: CRESA 9-1-1 <cresa@mycusthelp.net>

Date: Thu, May 24, 2018 at 2:56 PM

Subject: Records Request :: W009588-051718

To: getthetruth@comcast.net < getthetruth@comcast.net>

--- Please respond above this line ---



05/24/2018

private investigator John Visser 10000 NE 7th Ave. Suite 360 Vancouver WA 98685

RE: PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST of 5/17/2018, Reference # W009588-051718

Dear John,

CRESA received a public records request from you on 5/17/2018 related to the incident(s) located at: 2104 NE 98th Ave. Vancouver

Please note that since the incident(s) occurred more than six (6) years ago, there are no available records. In accordance with Washington State records retention guidelines, CRESA retains 9-1-1 records for six years from the date of the incident, after this retention period, these records are permanently deleted.

Your request is now considered withdrawn and closed.

Sincerely, CRESA Administrative Services

To monitor the progress or update this request please log into the CRESA PUBLIC RECORDS SYSTEM.

Exhibit P

I, Jeffrey Staples, certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct:

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Washington. In my capacity as an attorney at law I represented Daryl Rogers in Clark County Cause Number 17-1-00097-3. This declaration is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

As part of my representation of Mr. Rogers in this matter, I and my investigator attempted to obtain information regarding a 2010 incident that involved Mr. Rogers and the mother of the alleged victim in this matter where police were called. My investigator made a request to the regional 911 operator for any information it possessed, but we were informed that no records existed, as such records were only maintained for six years. We were also provided information from the prosecuting attorney's office indicating that they had made a similar request to the 911 operator and been informed there were no available records as well.


As part of my representation of Mr. Rogers in this matter, I requested discovery from the prosecuting attorney's office in writing. I believe, to the best of my recollection, that I also orally requested that the assigned prosecutor provide me any reports that were generated by police as part of the 2010 incident. My recollection is that no such reports were available and that none were provided to us.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN this day of December, 2020 in Vancouver, Washington.

Jeffrey Staples, WSBA# 40738

Attorney at Law

Exhibit Q



follow-up on report info - DARYL ROGERS

Hayes, Colin <Colin.Hayes@clark.wa.gov>

Wed, Oct 31, 2018 at 4:43 PM

To: "Jeff Staples (jeffstapleslaw@gmail.com)" <jeffstapleslaw@gmail.com>

Det. Hernandez checked with dispatch and they no longer have records from 2010. She called dispatch to verify.

She checked EPR (the old report writing system) and it is not showing up in there. That is the system that was being used in 2010.

Detective Hernandez is not sure exactly what it was she saw back in 2016, but she is now sure it was not a police report since there no record of one in EPR. She thinks that she what she came across was some sort of dispatch call notes.

Regards,

Colin P. Hayes

Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Clark County Prosecutor's Office

Children's Justice Center

601 W. Evergreen Blvd., Suite 101

P.O. Box 61992

Vancouver, WA 98666-5000

P: 360-397-6002

F: 360-759-6753

This e-mail and related attachments and any response may be subject to public disclosure under state law.

Exhibit R

GENERAL AFFIDAVIT

_, resident of <u>igii constantine way, age</u>rdeen,wa 98520 COMES NOW, DARYL BOGERS County of GRAYS HARBOR, State of WASHINGTON makes this his/her statement and General Affidavit upon oath and affirmation of belief and personal knowledge that the following matters, facts and things set forth are true and correct to the best of his/her knowledge: On March 1, 2016 during an investigative interview that turned into Case No. 17-1-00097-3, I informed the two Detectives conducting the interview, Detective Monica Hernandez and Detective James Phelps, of the 2010 police incident between myself and the complaining witness' family. I also requested of the Detectives to find documentation of the 2010 police incident as it would prove the last date that I had any contact with the complaining witness Jazmyne Ogletree. This date is significant because it contradicts the complaining witness' statement that I sexually abused or had inappropriate contact (Rape or Child Molestation) with her for over a year. This date is further significant as it would also contradict Amanda Poindexter's (complaining witness' mother) testimony that their family lived with me and my family for 4-6 months. If the documentation of the 2010 police incident was produced, its date would have refuted the only two prosecution witnesses with relevant testimony of the time in question, the complaining witness and her mother Amanda Poindexter. The missing documentation of the 2010 police incident and its date would validate my defense and impeach the complaining witness' testimony and in turn invalidated the prosecution's expert witnesses. Ms. Ogletree's statements regarding being sexually abused by me for over a year and the effects of this prolonged sexual abuse is the only basis for the testimony of the prosecutions expert witnesses. Therefore the missing documentation of the 2010 police incident and its date would impeach the complaining witness, which invalidates the prosecution's expert witnesses' testimony and validates my defense at trial.

My defense at trial was that (a) Hs. Ogletree and her family did not live with my family for a year or 4-6 months, but instead for a month and a half (it's to be noted that this month and a half includes the two week period leading up to the 2010 police incident, where the complaining witness and her family was out of the home and had no contact with me or my family. This is agreed upon by Amanda Poindexter the prosecution's witness.); (b) the short amount of time that I had contact with the complaining witness and her family in addition to 1. the amount of people living in the home (8 people that includes myself, Shatyra Rogersmy sister, Demetrius Rogers - my brother, Montreal Douglas - my friend, Jazmyne Ogletree-complaining witness, Amanda Poindexter-complaining witness' mother, Xavier Owens - complaining witness' brother, and James Poindexter-complaining witness' brother) 2. the 760 ft2 of available living space at 2104 NE 98th Avenue, Vancouver, WA 98664 (there was an additional 480 ft2 of garage space used. for storage and filled with boxes for a total of 1240 ft2 and3. The schedules of everyone in the home made it impossible for these crimes to have been committed; and (c) they family and the complaining witnesses family split on bad terms resulting in the 2010 police incident: While preparing for hial I explained the significance of some type of documentation of the 2010 police incident and that the Detectives were informed of this in 2016 to my trial attorney, Jeff Staples. I requested Mr. Staples obtain documentation of this 2010 police incident from the prosecution. This documentation was never handed over to my trial afterney. I also made a separate request for these documents. Trial for this case began on Monday, October 29, 2018. Throughout the trial the 2010 police incident was mentioned in excess of 30 times by prosecution and defense witnesses, establishing the importance of this incident. But when this incident occurred was not agreed on and was in fact heavily in dispute. This further establishes the importance of any documentation that proves the date of this 2010 police incident. The existence of documentation of the 2010 police incident being obtained by Defective Hernandez in 2016 while investigating this case was not mentioned during Detective Hemandez direct, cross, or rebuttal testimony at trial. Both the prosecution and defense rested its case around 4pm on Wednesday, October 31, 2018. An email acknowledging that Detective Hernandez had possession of documentation of the 2010 police incident in 2016 white investigating this case was sent to my trial attorney by the prosecuting attorney, Colin Hayes at 4:43 pm on Wednesday, October 31, 2018. I was never informed by my trial attorney that this email was sent by the prosecuting attorney. I was made aware of this email in late September 2020, after receiving my entire case file from my trial attorney.

This documentation of the 2010 police incident is the only impartial evidence gathered from the time in question (2010) and contains the last date that I had any contact with Ms. O'gletree or her family. All other evidence and/or testimony was gathered years later (2016) and is solely based on the complaining witnesses' statements. The documentation of the 2010 police incident and its date proves that I did not have contact with the complaining witness for a year, but instead for lo weeks or less. If this documentation of the 2010 police incident was made available it would have I corroborrated my trial testimony as well as the trial testimony of each defense witness; 2. contradicted the complaining witness' trial testimony; 3. invalidated expert witness testimony; and 4. Validated my trial defense.

William Signature, this tile 24 day of April , 2022	WITNESS my signature,	this the 2	29 day d	of April	, 20 <u>22</u> .
---	-----------------------	------------	----------	----------	------------------

PATOL ROJERS

Signature of Affiant

Affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, <u>Dickerson v. Wainwright</u>, 626 F.2d 1184 (1980); Affidavit sworn as true and correct under penalty of perjury and has full force of law and does not have to be verified by Notary Public.